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Jennings v. Rodriguez 
15-1204 
Ruling Below: Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015) 
Rodriguez sought relief on behalf of himself and others detained for more than six months 
without bond hearing during immigration proceedings. The requested relief constituted 
individualized bond hearings with burden on government. The district court denied the petition. 
Rodriguez appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court, 
entered preliminary injunction. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to class and entered permanent injunction. Parties 
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Question Presented: Whether aliens subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) 
must be afforded bond hearings if detention lasts six months;  
Whether aliens who fall under the mandatory detention provisions of Section 1226(c) must be 
afforded the same; 
Whether the government must demonstrate that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community in order to deny release on bond;  
Whether the length of detention must be weighed in the decision to release on bond; 
Whether new bond hearings must be afforded every six months. 
 
Alejandro RODRIGUEZ; Abdirizak Aden Farah; Jose Farias Cornejo; Yussuf Abdikadir; 
Abel Perez Ruelas, for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, 
Petitioners–Appellees/Cross–Appellants, 
and 
Efren Orozco, Petitioner, 
v. 
Timothy ROBBINS, Field Office Director, Los Angeles District, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement; Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Homeland Security; Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney 
General; Wesley Lee, Assistant Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement; Rodney Penner, Captain, Mira Loma Detention Center; Sandra Hutchens, 
Sheriff of Orange County; Nguyen, Officer, Officer–in–Charge, Theo Lacy Facility; 
Davis Nighswonger, Captain, Commander, Theo Lacy Facility; Respondents–
Appellants/Cross–Appellees. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Decided on October 28, 2015 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is the latest decision in our decade-long 
examination of civil, i.e. non-punitive and 
merely preventative, detention in the 
immigration context. As we noted in our 
prior decision in this case, Rodriguez v. 
Robbins, thousands of immigrants to the 
United States are locked up at any given time, 
awaiting the conclusion of administrative and 
judicial proceedings that will determine 
whether they may remain in this country. In 
2014, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) removed 315,943 
individuals, many of whom were detained 
during the removal process. According to the 
most recently available statistics, ICE detains 
more than 429,000 individuals over the 
course of a year, with roughly 33,000 
individuals in detention on any given day. 
 
Alejandro Rodriguez, Abdirizak Aden Farah, 
Jose Farias Cornejo, Yussuf Abdikadir, Abel 
Perez Ruelas, and Efren Orozco 
(“petitioners”) represent a certified class of 
noncitizens who challenge their prolonged 
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 
1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without 
individualized bond hearings and 
determinations to justify their continued 
detention. Their case is now on appeal for the 
third time. After a three-judge panel of our 
court reversed the district court's denial of 
petitioners' motion for class certification, and 
after our decision affirming the district 
court's entry of a preliminary injunction, the 
district court granted summary judgment to 
the class and entered a permanent injunction. 
 
Under the permanent injunction, the 
government must provide any class member 
who is subject to “prolonged detention”—six 
months or more—with a bond hearing before 
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). At that hearing, 
the government must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the detainee is a 
flight risk or a danger to the community to 
justify the denial of bond. The government 
appeals from that judgment. We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. 
 
I. Background 
 
On May 16, 2007, Alejandro Garcia 
commenced this case by filing a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in the Central District 
of California. Garcia's case was consolidated 
with a similar case filed by Alejandro 
Rodriguez, and the petitioners moved for 
class certification. The motion was denied on 
March 21, 2008. 
 
A three-judge panel of our court reversed the 
district court's order denying class 
certification. We held that the proposed class 
satisfied each requirement of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23: The government 
conceded that the class was sufficiently 
numerous; each class member's claim turned 
on the common question of whether 
detention for more than six months without a 
bond hearing raises serious constitutional 
concerns; Rodriguez's claims were 
sufficiently typical of the class's because “the 
determination of whether [he] is entitled to a 
bond hearing will rest largely on 
interpretation of the statute authorizing his 
detention”; and Rodriguez, through his 
counsel, adequately represented the class.  
The panel also noted that “any concern that 
the differing statutes authorizing detention of 
the various class members will render class 
adjudication of class members' claims 
impractical or undermine effective 
representation of the class” could be 
addressed through “the formation of 
subclasses.” 
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The government petitioned our court for 
panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. In 
response, the panel amended the opinion to 
expand its explanation of why the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) does not bar 
certification of the class and, with that 
amendment, unanimously voted to deny the 
government's petition. The full court was 
advised of the suggestion for rehearing en 
banc, and no judge requested a vote on 
whether to rehear the matter. The government 
did not file a petition for certiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 
On remand, the district court certified a class 
defined as: 
 
   “…all non-citizens within the 
Central District of California who: (1) 
are or were detained for longer than 
six months pursuant to one of the 
general immigration detention 
statutes pending completion of 
removal proceedings, including 
judicial review, (2) are not and have 
not been detained pursuant to a 
national security detention statute, 
and (3) have not been afforded a 
hearing to determine whether their 
detention is justified.” 
 
The district court also approved the proposed 
subclasses, which correspond to the four 
statutes under which the class members are 
detained—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 
1226(c), and 1231(a). The class does not 
include suspected terrorists, who are detained 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1537. Additionally, 
because the class is defined as non-citizens 
who are detained “pending completion of 
removal proceedings,” it excludes any 
detainee subject to a final order of removal. 
 
On September 13, 2012, the district court 
entered a preliminary injunction that applied 
to class members detained pursuant to two of 
these four “general immigration detention 
statutes”— §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c). Under 
the preliminary injunction, the government 
was required to “provide each [detainee] with 
a bond hearing” before an IJ and to “release 
each Subclass member on reasonable 
conditions of supervision ... unless the 
government shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that continued detention is justified 
based on his or her danger to the community 
or risk of flight.” 
 
The government appealed, and on April 16, 
2013, we affirmed. We applied the Court's 
preliminary injunction standard set forth in 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., which requires the petitioner to 
“establish that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that 
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.” 
 
Evaluating petitioners' likelihood of success 
on the merits, we began with the premise that 
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from 
government custody, detention, or other 
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart 
of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause 
protects.” “Thus, the Supreme Court has held 
that the indefinite detention of a once-
admitted alien ‘would raise serious 
constitutional concerns.’ ”  
 
Addressing those concerns, we recognized 
that we were not writing on a clean slate: 
“[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the 
Supreme Court and this court have grappled 
in piece-meal fashion with whether the 
various immigration detention statutes may 
authorize indefinite or prolonged detention of 
detainees and, if so, may do so without 
providing a bond hearing.’ ” First, in 
Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court 
resolved statutory and due process challenges 
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to indefinite detention under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(6), which governs detention beyond 
the ninety-day removal period, where 
removal was not practicable—for one 
petitioner because he was stateless, and for 
another because his home country had no 
repatriation treaty with the United States. 
 
Drawing on civil commitment jurisprudence, 
the Court reasoned: 
 
A statute permitting indefinite detention of an 
alien would raise a serious constitutional 
problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause forbids the Government to 
“depriv[e]” any “person ... of ... liberty ... 
without due process of law.” Freedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, 
detention, or other forms of physical 
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that 
Clause protects. And this Court has said that 
government detention violates that Clause 
unless the detention is ordered in a criminal 
proceeding with adequate procedural 
protections, or, in certain special and 
“narrow” nonpunitive “circumstances,” 
where a special justification, such as harm-
threatening mental illness, outweighs the 
“individual's constitutionally protected 
interest in avoiding physical restraint.” To 
avoid those “serious constitutional 
concerns,” the Court held that § 1231(a)(6) 
does not authorize indefinite detention 
without a bond hearing. Noting that the 
“proceedings at issue here are civil, not 
criminal,” the Court “construe[d] the statute 
to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ 
limitation,” and recognized six months as a 
“presumptively reasonable period of 
detention.” 
 
Although in dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disagreed with 
the majority's application of the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and argued that the 
holding would improperly interfere with 
international repatriation negotiations, 
Justice Kennedy recognized that “both 
removable and inadmissible aliens are 
entitled to be free from detention that is 
arbitrary or capricious.” Justice Kennedy 
further noted that although the government 
may detain non-citizens “when necessary to 
avoid the risk of flight or danger to the 
community,” due process requires “adequate 
procedures to review their cases, allowing 
persons once subject to detention to show that 
through rehabilitation, new appreciation of 
their responsibilities, or under *1068 other 
standards, they no longer present special risks 
or danger if put at large.”  
 
Second, in Demore v. Kim, the Court 
addressed a due process challenge to 
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c), which applies to non-citizens 
convicted of certain crimes. After discussing 
Congress's reasons for establishing 
mandatory detention, namely, high rates of 
crime and flight by removable non-citizens,  
the Court affirmed its “longstanding view 
that the Government may constitutionally 
detain deportable aliens during the limited 
period necessary for their removal 
proceedings.” Distinguishing Zadvydas, the 
Court in Demore stressed that detention 
under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination 
point” and typically “lasts for less than the 90 
days we considered presumptively valid in 
Zadvydas.” Although the Court therefore 
upheld mandatory detention under § 1226(c), 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, which 
created the majority, reasoned that “a lawful 
permanent resident alien such as respondent 
could be entitled to an individualized 
determination as to his risk of flight and 
dangerousness if the continued detention 
became unreasonable or unjustified.”  
 
After Zadvydas and Demore, our court 
decided several cases that provided further 
guidance for our analysis in Rodriguez II. In 
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Tijani v. Willis, we held that the 
constitutionality of detaining a lawful 
permanent resident under § 1226(c) for over 
32 months was “doubtful.” “To avoid 
deciding the constitutional issue, we 
interpret[ed] the authority conferred by § 
1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of 
criminal aliens” and held that “[t]wo years 
and eight months of process is not 
expeditious.” We therefore remanded Tijani's 
habeas petition to the district court with 
directions to grant the writ unless the 
government provided a bond hearing before 
an IJ within sixty days.  
 
We next considered civil detention in the 
immigration context in Casas–Castrillon v. 
Department of Homeland Security (Casas ). 
There, a lawful permanent resident who had 
been detained for nearly seven years under § 
1226(c) and then § 1226(a) sought habeas 
relief while his petition for review of his 
removal order was pending before our court. 
Applying Demore, we reasoned that § 
1226(c) “authorize [s] mandatory detention 
only for the ‘limited period of [the non-
citizen's] removal proceedings,’ which the 
Court estimated ‘lasts roughly a month and a 
half in the vast majority of cases in which it 
is invoked, and about five months in the 
minority of cases in which the alien chooses 
to appeal’ his removal order to the [Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ].” We 
therefore concluded that § 1226(c)'s 
mandatory detention provision applies only 
during administrative removal 
proceedings—i.e. until the BIA affirms a 
removal order. From that point until the 
circuit court has “rejected [the applicant's] 
final petition for review or his time to seek 
such review expires,” the government has 
discretionary authority to detain the non-
citizen pursuant to § 1226(a). We noted, 
however, that “[t]here is a difference between 
detention being authorized and being 
necessary as to any particular person.” 
Because the Court's holding in Demore 
turned on the brevity of mandatory detention 
under § 1226(c), we concluded that “the 
government may not detain a legal permanent 
resident such as Casas for a prolonged period 
without providing him a neutral forum in 
which to contest the necessity of his 
continued detention.” 
 
Soon after, in Singh v. Holder, we clarified 
the procedural requirements for bond 
hearings held pursuant to our decision in 
Casas (“Casas hearings”). In light of “the 
substantial liberty interest at stake,” we held 
that “due process requires a 
contemporaneous record of Casas hearings,” 
and that the government bears the burden of 
proving “by clear and convincing evidence 
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community to justify denial of bond.” To 
evaluate whether the government has met its 
burden, we instructed IJs to consider the 
factors set forth in In re Guerra, in particular 
“the alien's criminal record, including the 
extensiveness of criminal activity, the 
recency of such activity, and the seriousness 
of the offenses.” 
 
Finally, in Diouf v. Napolitano, we extended 
the procedural protections established in 
Casas to individuals detained under § 
1231(a)(6). We held that “prolonged 
detention under § 1231(a)(6), without 
adequate procedural protections,” like 
prolonged detention under § 1226(a), “would 
raise ‘serious constitutional concerns.’ ” To 
address those concerns, we held that “an alien 
facing prolonged detention under § 
1231(a)(6) is entitled to a bond hearing 
before an immigration judge and is entitled to 
be released from detention unless the 
government establishes that the alien poses a 
risk of flight or a danger to the community.” 
 
In Diouf II, we also adopted a definition of 
“prolonged” detention—detention that “has 
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lasted six months and is expected to continue 
more than minimally beyond six months”—
for purposes of administering the Casas bond 
hearing requirement. We reasoned that: 
 
    “When detention crosses the six-
month threshold and release or 
removal is not imminent, the private 
interests at stake are profound. 
Furthermore, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of liberty in the absence 
of a hearing before a neutral 
decisionmaker is substantial. The 
burden imposed on the government 
by requiring hearings before an 
immigration judge at this stage of the 
proceedings is therefore a reasonable 
one.” 
 
Applying these precedents to Rodriguez class 
members detained under § 1226(c), which 
requires civil detention of non-citizens 
previously convicted of certain crimes who 
have already served their state or federal 
periods of incarceration, we have concluded 
that “the prolonged detention of an alien 
without an individualized determination of 
his dangerousness or flight risk would be 
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these 
constitutional concerns, we held that “ § 
1226(c)'s mandatory language must be 
construed ‘to contain an implicit reasonable 
time limitation, the application of which is 
subject to federal-court review.’ ” “[W]hen 
detention becomes prolonged,” i.e., at the 
six-month mark, “ § 1226(c) becomes 
inapplicable”; the government's authority to 
detain the non-citizen shifts to § 1226(a), 
which provides for discretionary detention; 
and detainees are then entitled to bond 
hearings.  
 
In so holding, we rejected the government's 
attempt to distinguish Casas on the basis that 
“Casas concerned an alien who had received 
an administratively final removal order, 
sought judicial review, and obtained a 
remand to the BIA,” whereas this case 
involves “aliens awaiting the conclusion of 
their initial administrative proceedings.” We 
found that this argument reflected “a 
distinction without a difference”: “ 
‘Regardless of the stage of the proceedings, 
the same important interest is at stake—
freedom from prolonged detention.’ ”  
 
We also noted that our conclusion was 
consistent with the decisions of the two other 
circuits that have directly addressed this 
issue. In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the 
Third Circuit, applying the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, construed § 1226(c) 
to “authorize [ ] detention for a reasonable 
amount of time, after which the authorities 
must make an individualized inquiry into 
whether detention is still necessary to fulfill 
the statute's purposes of ensuring that an alien 
attends removal proceedings and that his 
release will not pose a danger to the 
community.” Applying that holding to the 
facts of the case, the Third Circuit held that 
the petitioner's detention, which had lasted 
nearly three years, “was unconstitutionally 
unreasonable and, therefore, a violation of 
the Due Process Clause.” Although the court 
declined to adopt a categorical definition of a 
“reasonable amount of time” to detain a non-
citizen without a bond hearing, it read 
Demore as we do—to connect the 
constitutionality of detention to its length and 
to authorize detention only for a “limited 
time.”  
 
Likewise, in Ly v. Hansen, the Sixth Circuit 
held that, to avoid a constitutional problem, 
removable non-citizens may be detained 
under § 1226(c) only “for a reasonable period 
of time required to initiate and conclude 
removal proceedings promptly.” Finding that 
the petitioner's 500–day–long detention was 
“unreasonable,” the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's grant of a writ of habeas 
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corpus. While maintaining that a “bright-line 
time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas, 
would not be appropriate for the pre-removal 
period,” the court recognized that Demore's 
holding “rel[ies] on the fact that Kim, and 
persons like him, will normally have their 
proceedings completed within a short period 
of time and will actually be deported, or will 
be released.” 
 
As to the Rodriguez subclass detained under 
§ 1225(b), we found “no basis for 
distinguishing between” non-citizens 
detained under that section and under § 
1226(c). The cases relied upon by the 
government for the proposition that arriving 
aliens are entitled to lesser due process 
protections—namely, Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei and Barrera–Echavarria 
v. Rison—were decided under pre-IIRIRA 
law and, as such, were inapposite. We 
therefore held that “to the extent detention 
under § 1225(b) is mandatory, it is implicitly 
time-limited.” As we had with § 1226(c), we 
explained that “the government's detention 
authority does not completely dissipate at six 
months; rather, the mandatory provisions of 
§ 1225(b) simply expire at six months, at 
which point the government's authority to 
detain the non-citizen would shift to § 
1226(a), which is discretionary and which we 
have already held requires a bond hearing.”  
 
After establishing that class members 
detained under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) are 
entitled to bond hearings after six months of 
detention, we clarified that the procedural 
requirements set forth in Singh apply to those 
hearings. These requirements include 
proceedings before “a neutral IJ” at which 
“the government bear[s] the burden of proof 
by clear and convincing evidence,” a lower 
burden of proof than that required to sustain 
a criminal charge. 
 
Having found that the class was likely to 
succeed on the merits, we turned to the other 
preliminary injunction factors. We found that 
the class members “clearly face irreparable 
harm in the absence of the preliminary 
injunction” because “the deprivation of 
constitutional rights unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.” The 
preliminary injunction safeguards 
constitutional rights by ensuring that 
“individuals whom the government cannot 
prove constitute a flight risk or a danger to 
public safety, and sometimes will not succeed 
in removing at all, are not needlessly 
detained.” Similarly, we found that the 
balance of equities favored the class 
members because “needless prolonged 
detention” imposes “major hardship,” 
whereas the government “cannot suffer harm 
from an injunction that merely ends an 
unlawful practice or reads a statute as 
required to avoid constitutional concerns.” 
Finally, we held that the preliminary 
injunction was consistent with the public 
interest, which is “implicated when a 
constitutional right has been violated,” and 
“benefits from a preliminary injunction that 
ensures that federal statutes are construed and 
implemented in a manner that avoids serious 
constitutional questions.” We therefore 
affirmed the district court's order. 
 
During the pendency of Rodriguez II, the 
parties conducted discovery, and class 
counsel adduced extensive evidence detailing 
the circumstances under which class 
members are detained. The parties then filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and 
the petitioners moved for a permanent 
injunction to extend and expand the 
preliminary injunction. 
 
On August 6, 2013, after we issued our 
decision in Rodriguez II, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the class 
members and entered a permanent injunction. 
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The permanent injunction applies to class 
members detained under any of the four civil 
“general immigration detention statutes”—
§§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a)—
and requires the government to provide each 
detainee with a bond hearing by his 195th day 
of detention. Applying our decisions in 
Casas, Singh, and Rodriguez II, the district 
court further ordered that bond hearings 
occur automatically, that detainees receive 
“comprehendible notice,” that the 
government bear the burden of proving “by 
clear and convincing evidence that a detainee 
is a flight risk or a danger to the community 
to justify the denial of bond,” and that 
hearings are recorded. However, the district 
court declined to order IJs to consider the 
length of detention or the likelihood of 
removal during bond hearings, or to provide 
periodic hearings for detainees who are not 
released after their first hearing. 
 
The government now appeals from the entry 
of the permanent injunction, arguing that the 
district court—and we—erred in applying the 
canon of constitutional avoidance to each of 
the statutes at issue. Relying on the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Zadvydas and Demore, 
the government argues that none of the 
subclasses are categorically entitled to bond 
hearings after six months of detention. 
Accordingly, the government contends that 
we should decertify the class and instead 
permit as-applied challenges to individual 
instances of prolonged detention, which 
could occur only through habeas 
proceedings. Petitioners counter that 
Rodriguez II is the law of the case and law of 
the circuit, requiring us to affirm the 
permanent injunction as to the § 1225(b) and 
§ 1226(c) subclasses, and that non-citizens 
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and § 1231(a) 
are entitled to bond hearings for reasons 
similar to those discussed in Rodriguez II. 
Petitioners cross-appeal the district court's 
order as to the procedural requirements for 
bond hearings; they argue that the district 
court erred in declining to require that IJs 
consider the likelihood of removal and the 
total length of detention, and in declining to 
require that non-citizens detained for twelve 
or more months receive periodic bond 
hearings every six months. 
 
II. Nature of Civil Immigration Detention 
 
Class members spend, on average, 404 days 
in immigration detention. Nearly half are 
detained for more than one year, one in five 
for more than eighteen months, and one in ten 
for more than two years. In some cases, 
detention has lasted much longer: As of April 
28, 2012, when the government generated 
data to produce to the petitioners, one class 
member had been detained for 1,585 days, 
approaching four and a half years of civil 
confinement. 
 
Non-citizens who vigorously pursue claims 
for relief from removal face substantially 
longer detention periods than those who 
concede removability. Requesting relief from 
an IJ increases the duration of class members' 
detention by an average of two months; 
appealing a claim to the BIA adds, on 
average, another four months; and appealing 
a BIA decision to the Ninth Circuit typically 
leads to an additional eleven months of 
confinement. Class members who persevere 
through this lengthy process are often 
successful: About 71% of class members 
have sought relief from removal, and roughly 
one-third of those individuals prevailed. 
However, many detainees choose to give up 
meritorious claims and voluntarily leave the 
country instead of enduring years of 
immigration detention awaiting a judicial 
finding of their lawful status. 
 
Class members frequently have strong ties to 
this country: Many immigrated to the United 
States as children, obtained legal permanent 
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resident status, and lived in this country for 
as long as twenty years before ICE initiated 
removal proceedings. As a result, hundreds 
of class members are married to U.S. citizens 
or lawful permanent residents, and have 
children who were born in this country. 
Further, many class members hold steady 
jobs—including as electricians, auto 
mechanics, and roofers—to provide for 
themselves and their families. At home, they 
are caregivers for young children, aging 
parents, and sick or disabled relatives. To the 
extent class members have any criminal 
record—and many have no criminal history 
whatsoever—it is often limited to minor 
controlled substances offenses. Accordingly, 
when class members do receive bond 
hearings, they often produce glowing letters 
of support from relatives, friends, employers, 
and clergy attesting to their character and 
contributions to their communities. 
 
Prolonged detention imposes severe hardship 
on class members and their families. Civil 
immigration detainees are treated much like 
criminals serving time: They are typically 
housed in shared jail cells with no privacy 
and limited access to larger spaces or the 
outdoors. Confinement makes it more 
difficult to retain or meet with legal counsel, 
and the resources in detention facility law 
libraries are minimal at best, thereby 
compounding the challenges of navigating 
the complexities of immigration law and 
proceedings. In addition, visitation is 
restricted and is often no-contact, 
dramatically disrupting family relationships. 
While in detention, class members have 
missed their children's births and their 
parents' funerals. After losing a vital source 
of income, class members' spouses have 
sought government assistance, and their 
children have dropped out of college. 
 
Lead petitioner Alejandro Rodriguez's story 
is illustrative. Rodriguez came to the United 
States as an infant and has lived here 
continuously since then. Rodriguez is a 
lawful permanent resident of the United 
States, and his entire immediate family—
including his parents, siblings, and three 
young children—also resides in the United 
States as citizens or lawful permanent 
residents. Before his removal proceedings 
began, Rodriguez worked as a dental 
assistant. In 2003, however, Rodriguez was 
convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance and sentenced to five years of 
probation and no jail time. He had one 
previous conviction, for “joyriding.” 
 
In 2004, ICE commenced removal 
proceedings and subjected Rodriguez to civil 
detention. An IJ determined that Rodriguez's 
prior conviction for “joyriding,” i.e. driving a 
stolen vehicle, qualified as an “aggravated 
felony” that rendered him ineligible for relief 
in the form of cancellation of removal, and 
therefore ordered him removed. Rodriguez 
appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, which 
affirmed, and then to the Ninth Circuit. In 
July 2005, a three-judge panel of our court 
granted the government's motion to hold 
Rodriguez's case in abeyance until the 
Supreme Court decided a related case, 
Gonzales v. Penuliar, which issued eighteen 
months later, in January 2007. In Penuliar, 
the Supreme Court vacated our court's 
opinion and remanded for further 
consideration in light of Gonzales v. Duenas–
Alvarez, which held that violating a 
California statute prohibiting taking a vehicle 
without the owner's consent qualifies as a 
“theft offense.” Between July 2005 and 
January 2007, while Rodriguez's case was in 
abeyance, ICE conducted four custody 
reviews on Rodriguez and repeatedly 
determined that Rodriguez was required to 
remain in detention until our court issued a 
decision on the merits of his claim. In mid–
2007, about a month after Rodriguez had 
moved for class certification, however, ICE 
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released him. At that point, Rodriguez had 
been detained for 1,189 days, roughly three 
years and three months. In April 2008, in the 
related case on remand from the Supreme 
Court, our court held that driving a stolen 
vehicle did not qualify as an aggravated 
felony. On motion of the parties, we then 
remanded Rodriguez's petition to the BIA, 
which granted his application for cancellation 
of removal, vindicating his right to lawfully 
remain in the United States. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
 
“We review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo.” “A permanent 
injunction ‘involves factual, legal, 
and discretionary components,’ so we 
‘review a decision to grant such relief 
under several different standards.’” 
“We review legal conclusions ... de 
novo, factual findings for clear error, 
and the scope of the injunction for 
abuse of discretion.” 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
In resolving whether the district court erred 
in entering the permanent injunction, we 
consider, first, petitioners' entitlement to 
bond hearings and, second, the procedural 
requirements for such hearings. Based on our 
precedents, we hold that the canon of 
constitutional avoidance requires us to 
construe the statutory scheme to provide all 
class members who are in prolonged 
detention with bond hearings at which the 
government bears the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the class 
member is a danger to the community or a 
flight risk. However, we also conclude that 
individuals detained under § 1231(a) are not 
members of the certified class. We affirm the 
district court's order insofar as it requires 
automatic bond hearings and requires IJs to 
consider alternatives to detention because we 
presume, like the district court, that IJs are 
already doing so when determining whether 
to release a non-citizen on bond.5 Because 
the same constitutional concerns arise when 
detention approaches another prolonged 
period, we hold that IJs must provide bond 
hearings periodically at six month intervals 
for class members detained for more than 
twelve months. However, we reject the 
class's suggestion that we mandate additional 
procedural requirements. 
 
A. Civil Detention 
 
“In our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception.” Civil detention 
violates the Due Process Clause except “in 
certain special and narrow nonpunitive 
circumstances, where a special justification, 
such as harm-threatening mental illness, 
outweighs the individual's constitutionally 
protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint.” Consistent with these principles, 
the Supreme Court has—outside of the 
immigration context—found civil detention 
constitutional without any individualized 
showing of need only when faced with the 
unique exigencies of global war or domestic 
insurrection. And even in those extreme 
circumstances, the Court's decisions have 
been widely criticized. In all contexts apart 
from immigration and military detention, the 
Court has found that the Constitution requires 
some individualized process and a judicial or 
administrative finding that a legitimate 
governmental interest justifies detention of 
the person in question. 
For example, in numerous cases addressing 
the civil detention of mentally ill persons, the 
Court has consistently recognized that such 
commitment “constitutes a significant 
deprivation of liberty,” and so the state “must 
have a constitutionally adequate purpose for 
the confinement.” Further, the “nature and 
duration of commitment” must “bear some 
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reasonable relation to the purpose for which 
the individual is committed.”  
 
Accordingly, the state may detain a criminal 
defendant found incapable of standing trial, 
but only for “the reasonable period of time 
necessary to determine whether there is a 
substantial probability that he will attain [the] 
capacity [to stand trial] in the foreseeable 
future.” At all times, the individual's 
“commitment must be justified by progress 
toward that goal.” Likewise, the state may 
detain a criminal defendant following an 
acquittal by reason of insanity in order to 
“treat the individual's mental illness and 
protect him and society from his potential 
dangerousness.” However, the detainee “is 
entitled to release when he has recovered his 
sanity or is no longer dangerous.” Further, 
although the state may detain sexually 
dangerous individuals even after they have 
completed their criminal sentences, such 
confinement must “take[ ] place pursuant to 
proper procedures and evidentiary 
standards.” To “justify indefinite involuntary 
commitment,” the state must prove both 
“dangerousness” and “some additional 
factor, such as a ‘mental illness' or ‘mental 
abnormality.’ ” 
 
Similarly, the Court has held that pretrial 
detention of individuals charged with “the 
most serious of crimes” is constitutional only 
because, under the Bail Reform Act, an 
“arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention 
hearing” to determine whether his 
confinement is necessary to prevent danger to 
the community. Further, “the maximum 
length of pretrial detention is limited by the 
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial 
Act.”  
 
In addition, the Court has held that 
incarceration of individuals held in civil 
contempt is consistent with due process only 
where the contemnor receives adequate 
procedural protections and the court makes 
specific findings as to the individual's ability 
to comply with the court order. If compliance 
is impossible—for instance, if the individual 
lacks the financial resources to pay court-
ordered child support—then contempt 
sanctions do not serve their purpose of 
coercing compliance and therefore violate the 
Due Process Clause.  
 
Early cases upholding immigration detention 
policies were a product of their time. Yet 
even these cases recognized some limits on 
detention of non-citizens pending removal. 
Such detention may not be punitive—
Congress may not, for example, impose 
sentences of “imprisonment at hard labor” on 
non-citizens awaiting deportation—and it 
must be supported by a legitimate regulatory 
purpose. Under these principles, the Court 
authorized the “detention or temporary 
confinement” of Chinese-born non-citizens 
“pending the inquiry into their true character, 
and while arrangements were being made for 
their deportation.” The Court also upheld 
executive detention of enemy aliens after the 
cessation of active hostilities because 
deportation is “hardly practicable” in the 
midst of war, and enemy aliens' “potency for 
mischief” continues “even when the guns are 
silent.” Similarly, the Court approved 
detention of communists to limit their 
“opportunities to hurt the United States 
during the pendency of deportation 
proceedings.” The Court recognized, 
however, that “purpose to injure could not be 
imputed generally to all aliens subject to 
deportation.” Rather, if the Attorney General 
wished to exercise his discretion to deny bail, 
he was required to do so at a hearing, the 
results of which were subject to judicial 
review. 
 
More recently, the Supreme Court has drawn 
on decades of civil detention jurisprudence to 
hold that “[a] statute permitting indefinite 
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detention of an alien would raise a serious 
constitutional problem.” Although the state 
has legitimate interests in “ensuring the 
appearance of aliens at future immigration 
proceedings” and “protecting the 
community,” post-removal period detention 
does not uniformly “ ‘bear[ ] [a] reasonable 
relation to the purpose for which the 
individual [was] committed.’ ” To avoid 
constitutional concerns, the Court construed 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statute governing 
post—removal period detention, to “limit[ ] 
an alien's post-removal-period detention to a 
period reasonably necessary to bring about 
that alien's removal from the United States.” 
Detention beyond that point requires “strong 
procedural protections” and a finding that the 
non-citizen is “specially dangerous.”  
 
Soon after Zadvydas, the Court rejected a due 
process challenge to mandatory detention 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which applies to 
non-citizens convicted of certain crimes. 
While affirming its “longstanding view that 
the Government may constitutionally detain 
deportable aliens during the limited period 
necessary for their removal proceedings,” the 
Court emphasized that detention under § 
1226(c) was constitutionally permissible 
because it has “a definite termination point” 
and typically “lasts for less than ... 90 days.” 
 
Since Zadvydas and Demore, our court has 
“grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether 
the various immigration detention statutes 
may authorize indefinite or prolonged 
detention of detainees and, if so, may do so 
without providing a bond hearing.” As we 
recognized in Casas, “prolonged detention 
without adequate procedural protections 
would raise serious constitutional concerns.” 
We have therefore held that non-citizens 
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and § 
1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings 
before an IJ when detention becomes 
prolonged.  
While the government falsely equates the 
bond hearing requirement to mandated 
release from detention or facial invalidation 
of a general detention statute, our precedents 
make clear that there is a distinction 
“between detention being authorized and 
being necessary as to any particular person.” 
Bond hearings do not restrict the 
government's legitimate authority to detain 
inadmissible or deportable non-citizens; 
rather, they merely require the government to 
“justify denial of bond” with clear and 
convincing “evidence that an alien is a flight 
risk or danger to the community.” And, in the 
end, the government is required only to 
establish that it has a legitimate interest 
reasonably related to continued detention; the 
discretion to release a non-citizen on bond or 
other conditions remains soundly in the 
judgment of the immigration judges the 
Department of Justice employs. 
 
Prior decisions have also clarified that 
detention becomes “prolonged” at the six-
month mark. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court 
recognized six months as a “presumptively 
reasonable period of detention.” By way of 
background, the Court noted that in 1996, 
Congress had “shorten[ed] the removal 
period from six months to 90 days.” The 
Court then explained: 
 
While an argument can be made for confining 
any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that 
when Congress shortened the removal period 
to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all 
reasonably foreseeable removals could be 
accomplished in that time. We do have 
reason to believe, however, that Congress 
previously doubted the constitutionality of 
detention for more than six months. 
Consequently, for the sake of uniform 
administration in the federal courts, we 
recognize that period. 
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Following Zadvydas, we have defined 
detention as “prolonged” when “it has lasted 
six months and is expected to continue more 
than minimally beyond six months.” At that 
point, we have explained, “the private 
interests at stake are profound,” and “the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the 
absence of a hearing before a neutral 
decisionmaker is substantial.” 
 
B. Entitlement to a Bond Hearing 
 
With this well-established precedent of the 
Supreme Court and our Court in mind, we 
review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment and entry of a permanent 
injunction. We consider, in turn, whether 
individuals detained under §§ 1226(c), 
1225(b), 1226(a), and 1231(a) are entitled to 
bond hearings after they have been detained 
for six months. 
 
1. The § 1226(c) Subclass 
 
Section 1226(c) requires that the Attorney 
General detain any non-citizen who is 
inadmissible or deportable because of his 
criminal history upon that person's release 
from imprisonment, pending proceedings to 
remove him from the United States. 
Detention under § 1226(c) is mandatory. 
Individuals detained under that section are 
not eligible for release on bond or parole; 
they may be released only if the Attorney 
General deems it “necessary” for witness 
protection purposes, id. § 1226(c)(2). 
 
An individual detained under § 1226(c) may 
ask an IJ to reconsider whether the mandatory 
detention provision applies to him, but such 
review is limited in scope and addresses only 
whether the individual is properly included in 
a category of non-citizens subject to 
mandatory detention based on his criminal 
history. At a “Joseph hearing,” a detainee 
“may avoid mandatory detention by 
demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not 
convicted of the predicate crime, or that the 
[DHS] is otherwise substantially unlikely to 
establish that he is in fact subject to 
mandatory detention.” “A determination in 
favor of an alien” at a Joseph hearing “does 
not lead to automatic release,” because the 
government retains discretionary authority to 
detain the individual under § 1226(a). 
Instead, such a determination allows the IJ to 
consider granting bond under the § 1226(a) 
standards, namely, whether the detainee 
would pose a danger or flight risk if released.  
 
As a result of § 1226(c)'s mandatory language 
and the limited review available through a 
Joseph hearing, individuals are often 
detained for years without adequate process. 
Members of the § 1226(c) subclass also tend 
to be detained for longer periods than other 
class members: The longest-detained class 
member was confined for 1,585 days and 
counting as of April 28, 2012, and the 
average subclass member faces detention for 
427 days. These lengthy detention times bear 
no relationship to the seriousness of class 
members' criminal history or the lengths of 
their previously served criminal sentences. In 
several instances identified by class counsel, 
a class member was sentenced to one to three 
months in prison for a minor controlled 
substances offense, then endured one or two 
years in immigration detention. Nor do these 
detention durations bear any relation to the 
merits of the subclass members' claims: Of 
the § 1226(c) subclass members who apply 
for relief from removal, roughly 40% are 
granted such relief, a rate even higher than 
that of the overall class. 
 
In Rodriguez II, we held that “the prolonged 
detention of an alien [under § 1226(c)] 
without an individualized determination of 
his dangerousness or flight risk would be 
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these 
“constitutional concerns, § 1226(c)'s 
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mandatory language must be construed ‘to 
contain an implicit reasonable time 
limitation.’ ” Accordingly, at the six-month 
mark, “when detention becomes prolonged, § 
1226(c) becomes inapplicable,” and “the 
Attorney General's detention authority rests 
with § 1226(a).” Under Casas, those 
detainees are then entitled to a bond hearing. 
 
Contrary to the government's argument, this 
holding is consistent with the text of § 
1226(c), which requires that the government 
detain certain non-citizens but does not 
mandate such detention for any particular 
length of time. Our holding is also consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Demore, which turned on the brevity of the 
detention at issue.  
 
Since Rodriguez II, no intervening changes in 
the law have affected our conclusions. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor our Circuit 
has had occasion to reexamine these issues, 
and the Third and Sixth Circuits have not 
changed the positions they adopted in Diop 
and Ly, respectively.  
 
Moreover, district courts have relied on 
Rodriguez II in resolving numerous habeas 
petitions filed by immigration detainees.  
 
Thus, Rodriguez II is law of the case and law 
of the circuit. As we recently explained, the 
“law of the case doctrine” provides that “a 
court will generally refuse to reconsider an 
issue that has already been decided by the 
same court or a higher court in the same 
case.” Likewise, pursuant to the “‘law of the 
circuit’ rule,” “a published decision of this 
court constitutes binding authority which 
‘must be followed unless and until overruled 
by a body competent to do so.’ ”  
 
The “‘general rule’ is that our decisions ‘at 
the preliminary injunction phase do not 
constitute the law of the case.’ ” Because 
preliminary injunction decisions are often 
“made hastily and on less than a full record,” 
they “may provide little guidance as to the 
appropriate disposition on the merits.” 
However, “there is an exception to the 
general rule for ‘conclusions on pure issues 
of law.’ ”  
 
The question resolved in Rodriguez II—
whether non-citizens subject to prolonged 
detention under § 1226(c) are entitled to bond 
hearings—is a pure question of law. We 
interpreted the statute by applying the canon 
of constitutional avoidance, and were bound 
to do so by our prior precedent. The decision 
was not made “hastily”; it provided a “fully 
considered appellate ruling” on the legal 
issues.  
 
2. The § 1225(b) Subclass 
 
Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants for 
admission” who are stopped at the border or 
a port of entry, or who are “present in the 
United States” but “ha[ve] not been 
admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The statute 
provides that asylum seekers “shall be 
detained pending a final determination of 
credible fear of persecution and, if found not 
to have such a fear, until removed.” As to all 
other applicants for admission, the statute 
provides that “if the examining immigration 
officer determines that an alien seeking 
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt 
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be 
detained” for removal proceedings.  
 
Under DHS regulations, non-citizens 
detained pursuant to § 1225(b) are generally 
not eligible for release on bond. If there are 
“urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit[s]” at stake, however, the 
Attorney General has discretion to 
temporarily parole such an individual into the 
United States, provided that the individual 
presents neither a danger nor a risk of flight. 
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Because parole decisions under § 1182 are 
purely discretionary, they cannot be appealed 
to IJs or courts. This lack of review has 
proven especially problematic when 
immigration officers have denied parole 
based on blatant errors: In two separate cases 
identified by the petitioners, for example, 
officers apparently denied parole because 
they had confused Ethiopia with Somalia. 
And in a third case, an officer denied parole 
because he had mixed up two detainees' files. 
As with § 1226(c), the government often cites 
§ 1225(b)'s mandatory language to justify 
indefinite civil detention without an 
individualized determination as to whether 
the detainee would pose a danger or flight 
risk if released. Section 1225(b) subclass 
members have been detained for as long as 
831 days, and for an average of 346 days 
each. These individuals apply for and receive 
relief from removal at very high rates: 94% 
apply, and of those who apply, 64% are 
granted relief. In illustrative cases identified 
by the petitioners, non-citizens fled to the 
United States after surviving kidnapping, 
torture, and murder of their family members 
in their home countries. Upon arrival, these 
individuals were detained under § 1225(b), 
and they remained in detention until the 
government granted their asylum 
applications hundreds of days later. 
 
In Rodriguez II, we extended Casas and held 
that to avoid serious constitutional concerns, 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b), like 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c), must 
be construed as implicitly time-limited. 
Accordingly, “the mandatory provisions of § 
1225(b) simply expire at six months, at which 
point the government's authority to detain the 
alien shifts to § 1226(a), which is 
discretionary and which we have already held 
requires a bond hearing.”  
 
In so holding, we recognized that many 
members of the § 1225(b) subclass are 
subject to the “entry fiction” doctrine, under 
which non-citizens seeking admission to the 
United States “may physically be allowed 
within its borders pending a determination of 
admissibility,” but “are legally considered to 
be detained at the border and hence as never 
having effected entry into this country.” Such 
non-citizens therefore “enjoy very limited 
protections under the United States 
constitution.” However, even if the majority 
of prolonged detentions under § 1225(b) are 
constitutionally permissible, “the Supreme 
Court has instructed that, where one possible 
application of a statute raises constitutional 
concerns, the statute as a whole should be 
construed through the prism of constitutional 
avoidance.” Section 1225(b) applies to 
several categories of lawful permanent 
residents who are not subject to the entry 
fiction doctrine but may be treated as seeking 
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). 
Because those persons are entitled to due 
process protections under the Fifth 
Amendment, prolonged detention without 
bond hearings would raise serious 
constitutional concerns. We therefore 
construed the statutory scheme to require a 
bond hearing after six months of detention 
under § 1225(b).  
 
The government now argues that “[d]espite 
years of discovery, petitioners have not 
identified any member of the Section 1225(b) 
subclass who is a [lawful permanent 
resident].” Petitioners represent that they 
have found lawful permanent residents who 
have been detained for more than six months 
under § 1225(b), although their submissions 
do not identify any specific individuals who 
fit that description. The question, however, is 
whether “one possible application of [the] 
statute raises constitutional concerns.” 
Because the government concedes that 
detention of lawful permanent residents 
under § 1225(b) is possible under § 
1101(a)(13)(C), “the statute as a whole 
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should be construed through the prism of 
constitutional avoidance.”  
 
The government also argues that lawful 
permanent residents treated as seeking 
admission are entitled to lesser due process 
protections than other lawful permanent 
residents. But the government has not 
provided any authority to support that 
proposition: The cases cited in the 
government's brief address statutory and 
regulatory distinctions between lawful 
permanent residents treated as applicants for 
admission and other lawful permanent 
residents; they do not reflect any 
constitutional distinction between those 
groups.  
 
Finally, the government argues that, instead 
of requiring bond hearings, we could avoid 
constitutional concerns by interpreting § 
1225(b) not to apply to lawful permanent 
residents. This argument relies on an 
implausible construction of the statutes at 
issue. Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants 
for admission,” and § 1101 defines six 
categories of lawful permanent residents as 
“seeking an admission into the United States 
for purposes of the immigration laws.”  
 
The Supreme Court's decision in Kwong Hai 
Chew v. Colding is not to the contrary. Chew 
involved a pre-IIRIRA immigration 
regulation that applied to “excludable” non-
citizens. Because the regulations were silent 
as to whether that category included lawful 
permanent residents returning from voyages 
abroad, the Court distinguished between the 
“exclusion” of newly arriving non-citizens 
and the “expulsion” of lawful permanent 
residents, thereby holding that the regulation 
did not authorize the Attorney General to 
detain arriving lawful permanent residents 
without hearings. Section 1101(a)(13)(C) 
forecloses an analogous construction of § 
1225(b) because it provides that “applicants 
for admission” includes several groups of 
lawful permanent residents. In any event, the 
government's alternative construction of § 
1225(b) was never raised before the district 
court; the argument is therefore forfeited.  
 
Accordingly, we adhere to Rodriguez II's 
holding regarding the § 1225(b) subclass as 
law of the case and law of the circuit. The 
government's attempts to re-litigate 
Rodriguez II are unavailing. 
 
3. The § 1226(a) Subclass 
 
Section 1226(a) authorizes detention 
“pending a decision on whether the alien is to 
be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a). The statute expressly authorizes 
release on “bond of at least $1,500” or 
“conditional parole.” Following an initial 
custody determination by DHS, a non-citizen 
may apply for a review or redetermination by 
an IJ, and that decision may be appealed to 
the BIA. At these hearings, the detainee bears 
the burden of establishing “that he or she does 
not present a danger to persons or property, is 
not a threat to the national security, and does 
not pose a risk of flight.” “After an initial 
bond redetermination,” a request for another 
review “shall be considered only upon a 
showing that the alien's circumstances have 
changed materially since the prior bond 
redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). The 
government has taken the position that 
additional time spent in detention is not a 
“changed circumstance” that entitles a 
detainee to a new bond hearing. 
Although § 1226(a) provides for 
discretionary, rather than mandatory, 
detention and establishes a mechanism for 
detainees to seek release on bond, non-
citizens often face prolonged detention under 
that section. In an extreme case identified by 
the petitioners, a non-citizen with no criminal 
record entered the United States on a tourist 
visa and affirmatively applied for asylum, 
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withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture shortly after that 
visa expired. ICE detained him throughout 
the ensuing proceedings before the IJ, the 
BIA, and the Ninth Circuit. At the time 
petitioners generated their report, he had been 
detained for 1,234 days with no definite end 
in sight. 
 
The district court's decision regarding the § 
1226(a) subclass was squarely controlled by 
our precedents. In Casas, we held that a non-
citizen subjected to prolonged detention 
under § 1226(a) is entitled to a hearing to 
establish whether continued detention is 
necessary because he would pose a danger to 
the community or a flight risk upon release. 
Since deciding Casas, we have repeatedly 
affirmed its holding.  
 
The government does not contest that Casas 
is the binding law of this circuit or that 
individuals detained under § 1226(a) are 
entitled to bond hearings. Instead, the 
government argues that § 1226(a) affords 
detainees the right to request bond hearings,  
so there is no basis for requiring the 
government to automatically provide bond 
hearings after six months of detention. This 
argument is foreclosed by Casas, which held 
that “§ 1226(c) must be construed as 
requiring the Attorney General to provide the 
alien with [a bond] hearing.” The record 
evinces the importance of Casas's holding on 
this point: Detainees, who typically have no 
choice but to proceed pro se, have limited 
access to legal resources, often lack English-
language proficiency, and are sometimes 
illiterate. As a result, many class members are 
not aware of their right to a bond hearing and 
are poorly equipped to request one. 
Accordingly, we conclude that class 
members are entitled to automatic bond 
hearings after six months of detention. We 
address the other procedural requirements for 
these hearings in Section IV.B, infra. 
4. The § 1231(a) Subclass 
 
Section 1231(a) governs detention of non-
citizens who have been “ordered removed.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a). The statute provides for 
mandatory detention during a ninety-day 
removal period. Id. § 1231(a)(2). Under the 
statute: 
 
The removal period begins on the latest of the 
following: 
 
(i) The date the order of removal 
becomes administratively final. 
 
(ii) If the removal order is judicially 
reviewed and if a court orders a 
stay of the removal of the alien, 
the date of the court's final order. 
 
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined 
(except under an immigration 
process), the date the alien is 
released from detention or 
confinement. 
 
The removal period may be extended beyond 
ninety days if a detainee “fails or refuses” to 
cooperate in his removal from the United 
States. 
 
“If the alien does not leave or is not removed 
within the removal period,” he “shall be 
subject to supervision,” but detention is no 
longer mandatory. Rather, the Attorney 
General has discretion to detain certain 
classes of non-citizens and to impose 
conditions of release on others. Before 
releasing a detainee, the government must 
conclude that removal is “not practicable or 
not in the public interest,” that the detainee is 
“non-violent” and “not likely to pose a threat 
to the community following release,” and that 
the detainee “does not pose a significant 
flight risk” and is “not likely to violate the 
conditions of release.”  
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Here, the class is defined, in relevant part, as 
non-citizens who are detained “pending 
completion of removal proceedings, 
including judicial review.” The class 
therefore by definition excludes any detainee 
subject to a final order of removal. 
 
Petitioners describe the § 1231(a) subclass as 
individuals detained under that section who 
have received a stay of removal from the BIA 
or a court. However, if a non-citizen has 
received a stay of removal from the BIA 
pending further administrative review, then 
the order of removal is not yet 
“administratively final.” The non-citizen has 
not been “ordered removed,” and the removal 
period has not begun, so § 1231(a) is 
inapplicable. Similarly, as long as a non-
citizen's removal order is stayed by a court 
pending judicial review, that non-citizen is 
not subject to “the court's final order.” In such 
circumstances, § 1231(a) is, again, 
inapplicable.  
 
Simply put, the § 1231(a) subclass does not 
exist. The district court's grant of summary 
judgment and permanent injunction are 
therefore reversed to the extent they pertain 
to individuals detained under § 1231(a). 
 
C. Procedural Requirements 
 
In addition to challenging the class members' 
entitlement to automatic bond hearings after 
six months of detention, the government 
objects to the district court's order regarding 
the burden and standard of proof at such 
hearings. The government also appeals the 
district court's ruling that IJs must consider 
alternatives to detention. Petitioners cross-
appeal the district court's rulings that IJs are 
not required to consider the ultimate 
likelihood of removal, assess the total length 
of detention, or conduct periodic hearings at 
six-month intervals. We address each issue in 
turn. 
1. Burden and Standard of Proof 
 
The government argues that the district court 
erred in requiring the government to justify a 
non-citizen's detention by clear and 
convincing evidence, an intermediate burden 
of proof that is more than a preponderance of 
the evidence but less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. As we noted in Rodriguez 
II, however, we are bound by our precedent 
in Singh, which held that “the government 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community to justify denial of bond at a 
Casas hearing.” 
 
In Singh, we explained that the “Supreme 
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle 
that ‘due process places a heightened burden 
of proof on the State in civil proceedings in 
which the individual interests at stake ... are 
both particularly important and more 
substantial than mere loss of money.’ ” In the 
civil commitment context, for example, the 
Supreme Court has recognized “the state's 
interest in committing the emotionally 
disturbed,” but has held that “the individual's 
interest in not being involuntarily confined 
indefinitely ... is of such weight and gravity 
that due process requires the state to justify 
confinement by proof more substantial than a 
mere preponderance of the evidence.” 
Drawing on this jurisprudence, Singh 
concluded that “a clear and convincing 
evidence standard of proof provides the 
appropriate level of procedural protection” in 
light of “the substantial liberty interest at 
stake.”  
 
The government now contends that Singh 
was wrongly decided. However, it is well 
established that only a full court, sitting en 
banc, may overrule a three-judge panel 
decision. Right or wrong, we are bound to 
follow Singh unless intervening Supreme 
Court authority is to the contrary.  
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2. Restrictions Short of Detention 
 
The government also argues that the district 
court erred in “determin [ing] that IJs are 
required to consider the use of alternatives to 
detention in making bond determinations.” 
As the district court's order states, however, 
IJs “should already be considering 
restrictions short of incarceration.” Indeed, 
Rodriguez II affirmed a preliminary 
injunction that directed IJs to “release each 
Subclass member on reasonable conditions of 
supervision, including electronic monitoring 
if necessary, unless the government” satisfied 
its burden of justifying continued detention. 
 
The government's objections to this 
requirement are unpersuasive. First, the 
government relies on Demore for the 
proposition that the government is not 
required “to employ the least burdensome 
means” of securing immigration detainees. 
But Demore applies only to “brief period[s]” 
of immigration detention. “When the period 
of detention becomes prolonged, ‘the private 
interest that will be affected by the official 
action’ is more substantial; greater 
procedural safeguards are therefore 
required.” Further, the injunction does not 
require that IJs apply the least restrictive 
means of supervision; it merely directs them 
to “consider” restrictions short of detention. 
The IJ ultimately must decide whether any 
restrictions short of detention would further 
the government's interest in continued 
detention. 
 
Second, the government argues that IJs are 
not empowered to impose conditions of 
release. However, federal regulations 
authorize IJs to “detain the alien in custody, 
release the alien, and determine the amount 
of bond, if any, under which the respondent 
may be released” and to “ameliorat[e] the 
conditions” of release imposed by DHS. 
Accordingly, if DHS detains a non-citizen, an 
IJ is already empowered to “ameliorat[e] the 
conditions” by imposing a less restrictive 
means of supervision than detention. 
 
Finally, the government argues that IJs lack 
the resources to engage in continuous 
monitoring of released individuals. However, 
the government fails to cite any law or 
evidence indicating that IJs, rather than DHS 
or ICE agents, would be responsible for 
implementing the conditions of release. 
Moreover, the record indicates that Congress 
authorized and funded an ICE alternatives-to-
detention program in 2002, and DHS has 
operated such a program, called the Intensive 
Supervision and Appearance Program, since 
2004. It is abundantly clear that IJs can and 
do17 consider conditions of release on bond 
when determining whether the government's 
interests can be served by detention only, and 
we conclude that DHS will administer any 
such conditions, regardless of whether they 
are imposed by DHS in the first instance or 
by an IJ upon later review. 
 
3. Length of Detention and Likelihood of 
Removal 
 
In their cross-appeal, petitioners argue that 
the district court erred in failing to require IJs 
to consider the length of a non-citizen's past 
and likely future detention and, relatedly, the 
likelihood of eventual removal from the 
United States. In our prior decisions, we have 
not directly addressed whether due process 
requires consideration of the length of future 
detention at bond hearings. We have noted, 
however, that “the due process analysis 
changes as ‘the period of ... confinement 
grows,’ ” and that longer detention requires 
more robust procedural protections. 
Accordingly, a non-citizen detained for one 
or more years is entitled to greater solicitude 
than a non-citizen detained for six months. 
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent 
provides that “detention incidental to 
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removal must bear a reasonable relation to its 
purpose.” At some point, the length of 
detention could “become[ ] so egregious that 
it can no longer be said to be ‘reasonably 
related’ to an alien's removal.” An IJ 
therefore must consider the length of time for 
which a non-citizen has already been 
detained. 
 
As to the likely duration of future detention 
and the likelihood of eventual removal, 
however, those factors are too speculative 
and too dependent upon the merits of the 
detainee's claims for us to require IJs to 
consider during a bond hearing. We therefore 
affirm the district court's ruling that 
consideration of those factors “would require 
legal and political analyses beyond what 
would otherwise be considered at a bond 
hearing” and is therefore not appropriate. We 
note that Zadvydas and its progeny require 
consideration of the likelihood of removal in 
particular circumstances,18 but we decline to 
require such analysis as a threshold inquiry in 
all bond hearings. 
 
4. Periodic Hearings 
 
The record shows that many class members 
are detained well beyond the six-month 
mark: Almost half remain in detention at the 
twelve-month mark, one in five at eighteen 
months, and one in ten at twenty-four 
months. Petitioners argue that due process 
requires additional bond hearings at six-
month intervals for class members who are 
detained for more than six months after their 
initial bond hearings. We have not had 
occasion to address this issue in our previous 
decisions, and it has been a source of some 
contention in the district courts.  
 
The district court here did not address this 
proposed requirement. For the same reasons 
the IJ must consider the length of past 
detention, we hold that the government must 
provide periodic bond hearings every six 
months so that noncitizens may challenge 
their continued detention as “the period of ... 
confinement grows.”  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This decision flows from the Supreme 
Court's and our own precedent bearing on the 
constitutional implications of our 
government's prolonged civil detention of 
individuals, many of whom have the legal 
right to live and work in our country. By 
upholding the district court's order that 
Immigration Judges must hold bond hearings 
for certain detained individuals, we are not 
ordering Immigration Judges to release any 
single individual; rather we are affirming a 
minimal procedural safeguard—a hearing at 
which the government bears only an 
intermediate burden of proof in 
demonstrating danger to the community or 
risk of flight—to ensure that after a lengthy 
period of detention, the government 
continues to have a legitimate interest in the 
further deprivation of an individual's liberty. 
Immigration Judges, a specialized and 
experienced group within the Department of 
Justice, are already entrusted to make these 
determinations, and need not release any 
individual they find presents a danger to the 
community or a flight risk after hearing and 
weighing the evidence. Accordingly, we 
affirm all aspects of the district court's 
permanent injunction, with three exceptions: 
We reverse as to the § 1231(a) subclass, and 
we hold that IJs must consider the length of 
detention and provide bond hearings every 
six months. We hereby remand to the district 
court to enter a revised injunction consistent 
with our instructions. 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN 
PART; REMANDED. 
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“Supreme Court to Review No-Bail Policy for Immigrants Awaiting 
Hearings” 
 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jess Bravin 
June 20, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
hear a Justice Department appeal of a 2015 
lower-court decision requiring bail hearings 
for immigrants who have been in detention 
for at least six months awaiting deportation 
proceedings. 
However, the American Civil Liberties 
Union—which won a lower-court ruling 
requiring bail hearings after six months—
said recently disclosed hearing records show 
a 2003 high-court precedent the Justice 
Department cited to bolster its case was 
partly based on government-supplied 
information that understated the length of 
immigration detentions. 
It isn’t clear whether a difference in the time 
frame would have affected the outcome of the 
2003 case. But critics of the government’s 
immigration policies say that prehearing 
detention with no chance for bail becomes 
less reasonable the longer it lasts. 
The 2003 case, Demore v. Kim, upheld by a 
5-4 vote the government’s practice of holding 
without bail immigrants—even those who are 
permanent U.S. residents with “green 
cards”—who became eligible for deportation 
because they committed a crime. 
The majority opinion in that case stressed the 
“very limited” length of no-bail detentions at 
issue, relying on figures showing the average 
detention in 2001 was 47 days, while the 15% 
of immigrants who appeal a deportation order 
were in detention for about 4½ months. The 
figures were provided by the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, which 
conducts the hearings. 
The ACLU, which worked on the 2003 case, 
said the actual average detention time in 2001 
was 2½ half weeks longer. “The real number 
is 65 days,” said Michael Tan, an ACLU 
attorney. The group learned of issues with 
statistics in the earlier case through a 
Freedom of Information Act request filed 
during the current litigation. 
Mr. Tan said the government reached the 
lower number by factoring in categories of 
aliens that an immigration judge was required 
to deport—cases that are resolved quickly 
because there are no issues for the hearing to 
resolve. Mr. Tan also said the government 
counted as completed cases that weren’t over 
but only transferred—with the immigrant still 
in detention—to another immigration court. 
Justice Department spokesman Patrick 
Rodenbush said officials were re-examining 
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the numbers provided in the Kim case, but 
after an initial review, “we feel our 
information to the court was appropriate.” 
A 2012 Justice Department inspector general 
report criticized the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review for reporting its 
performance in ways that are “incomplete 
and overstate the actual accomplishments” of 
its courts. 
Theodore Olson, who as solicitor general 
argued the government’s position in 2003, 
said he had little recollection of the case and 
didn’t remember any internal dispute over the 
length of detentions.“Statistics like that 
would presumably have come from the 
agency or agencies responsible,” Mr. Olson 
said. It would be “highly unlikely” for 
lawyers in his office to delve “into such 
statistics at a granular level.” 
David Strauss, a law professor at the 
University of Chicago, said the possibility of 
error in a solicitor general brief was troubling 
because unlike other litigants, the office often 
introduces new information at the Supreme 
Court level. 
“What the (solicitor general) says in its brief 
is not subject to the usual testing the legal 
system provides for its claims,” Mr. Strauss 
said. “The court is really counting on them to 
get it right because there’s no other check.” 
The court will hear the case on bail hearings 
in its next term, which begins in October. 
The Kim case marks the second time in recent 
years that a records disclosure suggested the 
Justice Department provided incorrect 
information to the Supreme Court regarding 
immigration practices. 
In 2012, the department told the court it had 
incorrectly stated in 2009 that it “facilitated” 
the return to the U.S. of deported aliens who 
later win their immigration appeals. The 
government then altered its practice to 
conform to what it told the court it already 
had been doing, government and immigration 
lawyers say. 
Last year, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in San Francisco held the 
Constitution’s due-process guarantee 
requires a bail hearing where detained 
immigrants can argue they will show up later 
for their date in immigration court and pose 
no risk to public safety. The Obama 
administration appealed that decision to the 
Supreme Court. 
In deciding the class-action suit, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on both the Kim precedent and 
an earlier case holding that immigrants 
detained indefinitely are entitled to a bail 
hearing after six months. The appeals court 
observed that affected immigrants “spend, on 
average, 404 days in immigration detention,” 
which is considered an administrative matter 
rather than a form of punishment. 
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“High Court To Decide If Immigrants Entitled To Bond Hearings” 
 
Law360 
Allissa Wickham 
June 20, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday decided 
to hear a case over whether certain 
immigrants are entitled to automatic bond 
hearings following six months of detention, 
adding another layer to the national debate 
over immigrant detention. 
The high court granted certiorari to Jennings 
v. Rodriguez, in which the Ninth Circuit 
ruled, among other things, that immigrants 
are entitled to bond hearings after six months 
if they were detained under a provision 
allowing the government to hold immigrants 
during their deportation proceedings. As is 
customary, the justices did not explain their 
reasoning for taking up the case. 
In its March 25 petition, the U.S. Department 
of Justice had strongly urged the justices to 
review the October ruling from the Ninth 
Circuit. The agency claimed the appeals 
court’s “wholesale revision” of the law on the 
detention of immigrants during deportation 
proceedings “oversteps the proper judicial 
role.” 
The government also argued that the court’s 
decision gets in the way of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s ability to control U.S. 
borders. 
But Alejandro Rodriguez, a green card holder 
representing a class of noncitizens 
challenging their detention, had asked the 
justices not to hear the appeal. 
“The government’s contention that certiorari 
is warranted to preserve its ability to control 
the borders and reduce the risk of terrorism is 
hyperbolic and unsupported by anything in 
the decision below or the voluminous record 
compiled in the district court,” Rodriguez had 
argued. 
If the high court were to affirm the Ninth 
Circuit, the impact of such a ruling could be 
significant, according to Denise Gilman, the 
director of the immigration clinic at the 
University of Texas School of Law. Such a 
decision would mean "whole swaths of the 
country" would be in a situation where people 
held under mandatory detention provisions 
would have a right to detention review, she 
previously told Law360. 
However, if the justices upheld the Ninth 
Circuit, the already overburdened 
immigration courts across the country could 
find themselves overwhelmed with having to 
set new hearings, according to Holly Cooper, 
the associate director of the immigration law 
clinic at University of California Davis 
School of Law, who submitted an amicus 
brief in the Rodriguez appeal. 
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"It would be enormous if every circuit 
adopted this ruling," Cooper said, noting that 
"immigration courts would probably almost 
buckle with the overwhelming need to set 
new hearings." 
The issue of immigrant detention has also 
popped up in other courts, such as the Second 
Circuit. The appeals court held in October 
that the government cannot indefinitely 
detain immigrants awaiting deportation 
proceedings following criminal offenses, 
saying they must be given a bail hearing 
within six months of being taken into 
custody. 
And in another case, the federal government 
is asking the Ninth Circuit to overturn a 
ruling that found the Obama administration’s 
detention of immigrant families violated a 
1997 agreement that set national standards 
for dealing with undocumented children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The federal petitioners are represented by 
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. 
The respondents have been represented in the 
case by Alan Thevanesan Arulanantham of 
the ACU oundation of Southern California, 
Sean Ashley Commons of Sidley Austin LLP 
and others. 
The case is David Jennings v. Alejandro 
Rodriguez, case number 15-1204, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
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“Courts Say Detained Non-Citizens Have The Right To Bond Hearings” 
 
NPR 
Richard Gonzales 
October 29, 2015 
 
At the same time that immigration is a hot-
button issue on the presidential campaign 
trail, in the courts, immigration advocates are 
chipping away at the government's authority 
to detain non-citizens indefinitely. 
Two rulings issued this week from the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New 
York and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in California say that detainees have the right 
to a bond hearing while they are fighting their 
deportation cases. 
The practical impact? Thousands of 
immigrants, legal or not, who were held for 
indefinite periods now have the right to a 
release hearing where it will be up to an 
immigration judge to decide whether they are 
dangerous or present a flight risk. The courts' 
rulings apply in the states covered by those 
circuits. 
Ever since 1996, when Congress passed the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, the government has 
detained broad categories of non-citizens for 
prolonged periods and denied them the right 
to challenge their detention. 
The constitutionality of that section of the 
law was first challenged in 2003. Since then, 
there's been a flurry of court rulings. 
"Every circuit [appeals] court has ruled that it 
is unlawful to hold a detainee without that 
person having the possibility of a hearing," 
said Ahilan Arulanantham, deputy legal 
director of the ACLU of Southern California. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. Robbins, 
ruled that the government has to justify "by 
clear and convincing evidence that an alien is 
a flight risk or a danger to the community to 
justify denial of bond." It also ruled the 
government has to consider alternatives to 
detention such as electronic monitoring 
devices. Finally, it said detainees should get 
a bond hearing every six months. 
"This decision substantially decreases the 
likelihood people will get lost in the system 
for years on end because there will be some 
examination of why the person is still locked 
away. It provides them with an elemental 
component of due process," said 
Arulanantham. 
In a more limited ruling, the Second Circuit 
in New York, in a case called Lora v. 
Shanahan adopted what it called "a bright-
line rule" that detainees must get a hearing 
within six months of his or her detention. 
Two other appellate courts, the Third and the 
Sixth Circuits, have ruled that a detainee 
341 
 
must file a habeas petition or a lawsuit before 
getting a hearing. 
With respect to the Ninth Circuit ruling, a 
spokesman for U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement said his agency "is 
aware of the judges' order and reviewing it." 
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Lynch v. Morales-Santana 
15-1191 
Ruling Below: Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015) 
Luis Morales was born the child of an unwed couple. His father was a US citizen, while his 
mother was not. Morales attempted to establish himself as a citizen under the doctrine of 
derivative citizenship. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion to reevaluate his 
claim. Morales appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that the grant of citizenship was permissible, and that the gender 
discrepancy placed on the physical presence requirement of derivative citizenship violated equal 
protection 
Question Presented: Whether Congress’s decision to impose a different physical-presence 
requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of 
foreign-born children through 8 U.S.C. 1401 and 1409 (1958) violates the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection; and whether the court of appeals erred in conferring U.S. 
citizenship on respondent, in the absence of any express statutory authority to do so. 
 
Luis Ramon MORALES–SANTANA, aka Luis Morales, Petitioner, 
v. 
Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney GENERAL, Respondent. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
Decided on July 8, 2015, Amended on October 30, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
LOHIER, Circuit Judge: 
 
Luis Ramon Morales–Santana asks us to 
review a March 3, 2011 decision of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his 
motion to reopen his removal proceedings 
relating to his claim of derivative citizenship. 
Under the statute in effect when Morales–
Santana was born—the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (the “1952 Act”)—a 
child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother 
and non-citizen father has citizenship at birth 
so long as the mother was present in the 
United States or one of its outlying 
possessions for a continuous period of at least 
one year at some point prior to the child's 
birth. By contrast, a child born abroad to an 
unwed citizen father and non-citizen mother 
has citizenship at birth only if the father was 
present in the United States or one of its 
outlying possessions prior to the child's birth 
for a period or periods totaling at least ten 
years, with at least five of those years 
occurring after the age of fourteen. Morales–
Santana's father satisfied the requirements for 
transmitting citizenship applicable to unwed 
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mothers but not the more stringent 
requirements applicable to unwed fathers. On 
appeal, Morales–Santana argues principally 
that this gender-based difference violates the 
Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal 
protection and that the proper remedy is to 
extend to unwed fathers the benefits unwed 
mothers receive under § 1409(c). We agree 
and hold that Morales–Santana derived 
citizenship at birth through his father. We 
accordingly REVERSE the BIA's decision 
and REMAND for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
I. Facts 
 
The following undisputed facts are drawn 
from the record on appeal. Morales–
Santana's father, Jose Dolores Morales, was 
born in Puerto Rico on March 19, 1900 and 
acquired United States citizenship in 1917 
pursuant to the Jones Act. He was physically 
present in Puerto Rico until February 27, 
1919, 20 days before his nineteenth birthday, 
when he left Puerto Rico to work in the 
Dominican Republic for the South Porto Rico 
Sugar Company. 
 
In 1962 Morales–Santana was born in the 
Dominican Republic to his father and his 
Dominican mother. Morales–Santana was 
what is statutorily described as 
“legitimat[ed]” by his father upon his parents' 
marriage in 1970 and admitted to the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident in 1975. 
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). Morales–Santana's father 
died in 1976. 
 
II. Statutory Framework 
 
Unlike citizenship by naturalization, 
derivative citizenship exists as of a child's 
birth or not at all. The law in effect at the time 
of birth governs whether a child obtained 
derivative citizenship as of his or her birth. 
Accordingly, the 1952 Act provides the 
statutory framework applicable to Morales–
Santana's nationality claim. 
 
As noted, the 1952 Act limits the ability of an 
unwed citizen father to confer citizenship on 
his child born abroad—where the child's 
mother is not a citizen at the time of the 
child's birth—more stringently than it limits 
the ability of a similarly situated unwed 
citizen mother to do the same. We note that 
this difference in treatment of unwed citizen 
fathers and unwed citizen mothers, though 
diminished, persists in the current statute.  
 
III. Procedural History 
 
In 2000 Morales–Santana was placed in 
removal proceedings after having been 
convicted of various felonies. He applied for 
withholding of removal on the basis of 
derivative citizenship obtained through his 
father. An immigration judge denied the 
application. In 2010 Morales–Santana *525 
filed a motion to reopen based on a violation 
of equal protection and newly obtained 
evidence relating to his father. The BIA 
rejected Morales–Santana's arguments for 
derivative citizenship and denied his motion 
to reopen. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Morales–Santana makes four arguments for 
derivative citizenship: (1) that his father's 
physical absence from the United States 
during the 20 days directly prior to his 
father's nineteenth birthday constituted a de 
minimis “gap” in physical presence, and that 
such gaps should not count against a finding 
of physical presence for purposes of § 
1401(a)(7); (2) that the South Porto Rico 
Sugar Company, which employed his father 
after his father moved to the Dominican 
Republic, was a multi-national United States-
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owned company and therefore effectively 
part of the United States government or an 
international organization as defined in 22 
U.S.C. § 288; (3) that at the time his father 
moved to the Dominican Republic it was an 
“outlying possession” of the United States; 
and (4) as noted, that the different physical 
presence requirements applicable to unwed 
fathers and unwed mothers under the 1952 
Act violate equal protection. 
 
Consistent with our obligation to avoid 
constitutional questions if possible, we first 
address Morales–Santana's three statutory 
arguments for derivative citizenship.  
 
As to both his statutory and constitutional 
arguments, we review de novo the question 
of Morales–Santana's derivative citizenship. 
“If the petitioner claims to be a national of the 
United States and the court of appeals finds 
from the pleadings and affidavits that no 
genuine issue of material fact about the 
petitioner's nationality is presented, the court 
shall decide the nationality claim.” No 
material facts are disputed. 
 
I. Statutory Arguments 
 
Morales–Santana contends that his father's 
absence from the United States during the 20 
days prior to his father's nineteenth birthday 
constitutes a de minimis “gap” in his father's 
physical presence and that such gaps should 
not be held against someone who claims to 
have satisfied the 1952 Act's physical 
presence requirement. In support, Morales–
Santana points to continuous physical 
presence requirements under the immigration 
laws that explicitly excuse de minimis 
absences. By its plain terms, § 1401(a)(7) had 
no similar exception. In any event, because 
Morales–Santana's father left the United 
States and its outlying possessions 20 days 
prior to his nineteenth birthday and never 
returned, there was no “gap” in his father's 
physical presence that bridged two periods of 
physical presence. So even if we recognized 
an exception to the physical presence 
requirement in § 1401 for de minimis “gaps,” 
we would reject Morales–Santana's claim on 
this basis. 
 
Relying on the 1966 Act, Morales–Santana 
next argues that his father's employment with 
the South Porto Rico Sugar Company in the 
Dominican Republic immediately after 
leaving Puerto Rico satisfied the statute's 
physical presence requirement by effectively 
continuing his physical presence through the 
requisite period. It is true that the 1966 Act 
provided that employment with the United 
States Government or with an international 
organization, as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 288, 
satisfied the physical presence requirement. 
But Morales–Santana's argument lacks merit 
because his father's employment with the 
South Porto Rico Sugar Company, a 
multinational company, did not constitute 
employment with the United States 
Government. Nor did it constitute 
employment with an international 
organization as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 288, 
since the South Porto Rico Sugar Company 
was neither “a public international 
organization in which the United States 
participates pursuant to any treaty or under 
the authority of any Act of Congress 
authorizing such participation or making an 
appropriation for such participation,” nor 
“designated by the President” as such.  
 
As his final statutory argument, Morales–
Santana contends that the Dominican 
Republic was an “outlying possession” of the 
United States for purposes of the 1952 Act 
when Morales–Santana's father was there in 
1919. Two factors convince us that Congress 
did not intend to include the Dominican 
Republic within the scope of the term 
“outlying possession” in § 1401.4 
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First, there is no treaty or lease pursuant to 
which the Dominican Republic was acquired. 
This stands in contrast to the Philippines, 
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, all of which were acquired by the 
United States by treaty, and all of which were 
outlying possessions when the United States 
exercised sovereignty over them. The case of 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is a little different in 
that it involves both a lease and a treaty, but 
it yields the same result vis-à-vis the 
Dominican Republic. In Boumediene v. Bush, 
the Supreme Court determined that the 
“complete jurisdiction and control” by the 
United States over Guantanamo Bay 
constituted “de facto ” sovereignty over it. 
The Court added, though, that in a 1903 
Lease Agreement between Cuba and the 
United States, the former granted the latter 
“complete jurisdiction and control” over 
Guantanamo Bay and that “[u]nder the terms 
of [a] 1934 [t]reaty, ... Cuba effectively has 
no rights as a sovereign until the parties agree 
to modification of the 1903 Lease Agreement 
or the United States abandons” Guantanamo 
Bay. By contrast, there is no lease or treaty 
that conferred to the United States de facto or 
de jure sovereignty over the Dominican 
Republic. 
 
Second, we acknowledge the historical fact 
that the United States exercised significant 
control during its military occupation of the 
Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. But 
that control did not extinguish the 
sovereignty of the Dominican Republic. 
Indeed, the Proclamation of the Military 
Occupation of Santo Domingo by the United 
States specifically declared that the purpose 
of the temporary military occupation was “to 
give aid to [the Dominican Republic] in 
returning to a condition of internal order” 
without “destroying the sovereignty of” the 
Dominican Republic.  
 
Having rejected Morales–Santana's statutory 
arguments for derivative citizenship, we now 
consider his constitutional equal protection 
argument. 
 
II. Equal Protection 
 
Morales–Santana argues principally that the 
1952 Act's treatment of derivative citizenship 
conferral rights violates the Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.5 
As we have explained, under the 1952 Act, 
an unwed citizen mother confers her 
citizenship on her child (born abroad to a 
non-citizen biological father) so long as she 
has satisfied the one-year continuous 
presence requirement prior to the child's 
birth. The single year of presence by the 
mother can occur at any time prior to the 
child's birth—including, for example, from 
the mother's first birthday until her second 
birthday. An unwed citizen father, by 
contrast, faces much more stringent 
requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), 
which incorporates § 1401(a)(7). He is 
prevented from transmitting his citizenship 
(to his child born abroad to a non-citizen 
mother) unless he was physically present in 
the United States or an outlying possession 
prior to the child's birth for a total of at least 
ten years. Because five of those years must 
follow the father's fourteenth birthday, an 
unwed citizen father cannot transmit his 
citizenship to his child born abroad to a non-
citizen mother before the father's nineteenth 
birthday. Eighteen-year-old citizen fathers 
and their children are out of luck. 
 
As both parties agree, had Morales–Santana's 
mother, rather than his father, been a citizen 
continuously present in Puerto Rico until 20 
days prior to her nineteenth birthday, she 
would have satisfied the requirements to 
confer derivative citizenship on her child. It 
is this gender-based difference in treatment 
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that Morales–Santana claims violated his 
father's right to equal protection. 
 
The Government asserts that the difference is 
justified by two interests: (1) ensuring a 
sufficient connection between citizen 
children and the United States, and (2) 
avoiding statelessness. In what follows, we 
apply intermediate scrutiny to assess these 
asserted interests, and we conclude that 
neither interest is advanced by the statute's 
gender-based physical presence 
requirements. After determining that these 
physical presence requirements violate equal 
protection, we apply the statute's severance 
clause and determine that Morales–Santana, 
under the statute stripped of its constitutional 
defect, has citizenship as of his birth. 
 
A. Level of Scrutiny 
 
We apply intermediate, “heightened” 
scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis 
of gender. Under intermediate scrutiny, the 
government classification must serve actual 
and important governmental objectives, and 
the discriminatory means employed must be 
substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives. Furthermore, the 
justification for the challenged classification 
“must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation. 
And it must not rely on overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and 
females.”  
 
In urging us to apply rational basis scrutiny 
instead, the Government relies on Fiallo v. 
Bell. In Fiallo, the Supreme Court applied 
rational basis scrutiny to a section of the 1952 
Act that gave special preference for 
admission into the United States to non-
citizens born out of wedlock seeking entry by 
virtue of a relationship with their citizen 
mothers, but not to similarly situated non-
citizens seeking entry by virtue of a 
relationship with their citizen fathers. The 
Court reasoned that rational basis scrutiny 
was warranted because “over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress 
more complete than it is over the admission 
of aliens,” and “[o]ur cases have long 
recognized the power to expel or exclude 
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government's political 
departments.”  
 
But Fiallo is distinguishable. In Fiallo, the 
children's alienage implicated Congress's 
“exceptionally broad power” to admit or 
remove non-citizens. Here, by contrast, there 
is no similar issue of alienage that would 
trigger special deference. Because Morales–
Santana instead claims pre-existing 
citizenship at birth, his challenge does not 
implicate Congress's “power to admit or 
exclude foreigners,” and therefore is not 
governed by Fiallo. 
 
Our view of Fiallo's limited scope is 
grounded in Supreme Court and circuit 
caselaw. As an initial matter, we note that the 
Supreme Court has never applied the 
deferential Fiallo standard to issues of gender 
discrimination under § 1409, despite being 
asked to do so on at least three occasions. 
Justice Stevens' opinion in Miller succinctly 
described Fiallo's limitation: “It is of 
significance that the petitioner in this case, 
unlike the petitioners in Fiallo, ... is not 
challenging the denial of an application for 
special [immigration] status. She is 
contesting the Government's refusal to ... 
treat her as a citizen. If she were to prevail, 
the judgment ... would confirm her pre-
existing citizenship.”  
 
Although no opinion in Miller received a 
majority of votes, we observed in Lake v. 
Reno that “seven justices in Miller would 
have applied heightened scrutiny ... [to INA] 
347 
 
section 309(a).” Later, in Lewis v. Thompson, 
we explained Lake's holding in a way that 
makes it clear that heightened scrutiny, rather 
than Fiallo's more deferential standard of 
review, should apply to Morales–Santana's 
claim: “[W]e have already held in Lake, 
drawing an inference from the various 
opinions of the Justices in Miller, that citizen 
claimants with an equal protection claim 
deserving of heightened scrutiny do not lose 
that favorable form of review simply because 
the case arises in the context of immigration.” 
Our sister circuits that have considered 
Fiallo's application to claims similar to 
Morales–Santana's are in accord.  
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the 
gender-based scheme in §§ 1401 and 1409 
can be upheld only if the Government shows 
that it is substantially related to an actual and 
important governmental objective. In 
assessing the validity of the gender-based 
classification, moreover, we consider the 
existence of gender-neutral alternatives to the 
classification.  
 
B. Governmental Interests and Tailoring 
 
Having determined that intermediate scrutiny 
applies, we examine the two interests that the 
Government claims support the statute's 
gender-based distinction. 
 
1. Ensuring a Sufficient Connection Between 
the Child and the United States 
 
The Government asserts that Congress 
passed the 1952 Act's physical presence 
requirements in order to “ensur[e] that 
foreign-born children of parents of different 
nationalities have a sufficient connection to 
the United States to warrant citizenship.” As 
both parties agree, this interest is important, 
and Congress actually had it in mind when 
requiring some period of physical presence 
before a citizen parent could confer 
citizenship on his or her child born abroad.  
 
The Government invokes this important 
interest but fails to justify the 1952 Act's 
different treatment of mothers and fathers by 
reference to it. It offers no reason, and we see 
no reason, that unwed fathers need more time 
than unwed mothers in the United States prior 
to their child's birth in order to assimilate the 
values that the statute seeks to ensure are 
passed on to citizen children born abroad. 
 
We recognize that our determination 
conflicts with the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit in Flores–Villar which addressed the 
same statutory provisions and discussed the 
same governmental interest in ensuring a 
connection between child and country. The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that in addition to 
preventing or reducing statelessness—an 
objective we address below—“[t]he 
residence differential ... furthers the objective 
of developing a tie between the child, his or 
her father, and this country.” The Ninth 
Circuit provided no explanation for its 
conclusion, and the Government provides 
none here. 
 
Instead, the Government relies on Nguyen to 
explain why the different physical presence 
requirements for unwed men and women 
reflect a concern with ensuring an adequate 
connection between the child and the United 
States. We are not persuaded. In Nguyen, the 
Court upheld the Immigration and 
Nationality Act's requirement that a citizen 
father seeking to confer derivative citizenship 
on his foreign-born child take the affirmative 
step of either legitimating the child, declaring 
paternity under oath, or obtaining a court 
order of paternity. The Nguyen Court 
determined that two interests supported the 
legitimation requirement for citizen fathers of 
children born abroad. 
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The first interest, “assuring that a biological 
parent-child relationship exists,” is irrelevant 
to the 1952 Act's physical presence 
requirements because derivative citizenship 
separately requires unwed citizen fathers to 
have legitimated their foreign-born children. 
Here, Morales–Santana's father established 
his biological tie to Morales–Santana by 
legitimating him. His physical presence in 
Puerto Rico for ten years as opposed to one 
year prior to Morales–Santana's birth would 
have provided no additional assurance that a 
biological tie existed. 
 
The Nguyen Court identified a second 
interest in ensuring “that the child and the 
citizen parent have some demonstrated 
opportunity or potential to develop” a “real, 
meaningful relationship.” The Court 
explained that a biological mother, by virtue 
of giving birth to the child, “knows that the 
child is in being and is hers,” but that an 
unwed biological father might in some cases 
not even “know that a child was conceived, 
nor is it always clear that even the mother will 
be sure of the father's identity.” Rather than 
requiring a case-by-case analysis of whether 
a father or a mother has a “real, meaningful 
relationship” with a child born abroad, 
“Congress enacted an easily administered 
scheme to promote the different but still 
substantial interest of ensuring at least an 
opportunity for a parent-child relationship to 
develop.” This interest in ensuring the 
“opportunity for a real, meaningful 
relationship” between parent and child is 
likewise not relevant to the 1952 Act's 
physical presence requirements. By 
legitimating his son, Morales–Santana's 
father took the affirmative step of 
demonstrating that an opportunity for a 
meaningful relationship existed. And again, 
requiring that Morales–Santana's father be 
physically present in Puerto Rico prior to 
Morales–Santana's birth for ten years instead 
of one year would have done nothing to 
further ensure that an opportunity for such a 
relationship existed. 
 
So we agree that unwed mothers and fathers 
are not similarly situated with respect to the 
two types of parent-to-child “ties” justifying 
the legitimation requirement at issue in 
Nguyen. But unwed mothers and fathers are 
similarly situated with respect to how long 
they should be present in the United States or 
an outlying possession prior to the child's 
birth in order to have assimilated citizenship-
related values to transmit to the child. 
Therefore, the statute's gender-based 
distinction is not substantially related to the 
goal of ensuring a sufficient connection 
between citizen children and the United 
States. 
 
2. Preventing Statelessness 
 
Having concluded that the Government's 
interest in establishing a connection between 
the foreign-born child and the United States 
does not explain or justify the gender-based 
distinction in the 1952 Act's physical 
presence requirements, we now turn to the 
Government's other asserted interest. The 
Government argues that Congress enacted 
different physical presence requirements in § 
1409(a) (incorporating § 1401(a)(7)) and § 
1409(c) to reduce the level of statelessness 
among newborns. For example, a child born 
out of wedlock abroad may be stateless if he 
is born inside a country that does not confer 
citizenship based on place of birth and neither 
of the child's parents conferred derivative 
citizenship on him. 
 
The avoidance of statelessness is clearly an 
important governmental interest. Contrary to 
the Government's claim, though, avoidance 
of statelessness does not appear to have been 
Congress's actual purpose in establishing the 
physical presence requirements in the 1952 
Act, and in any event the gender-based 
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distinctions in the 1952 Act's physical 
presence requirements are not substantially 
related to that objective. 
 
a. Actual Purpose 
 
Some historical background is useful to 
understand Congress's purpose in 
establishing the 1952 Act's gender-based 
physical presence requirements. Until 1940, 
a citizen father whose child was born abroad 
transmitted his citizenship to that child if the 
father had resided in the United States for any 
period of time prior to the child's birth. 
Consistent with common law notions of 
coverture, and with the notion that the 
husband determined the political and cultural 
character of his dependents (wife and 
children included), prior to 1934 married 
women had no statutory right to confer their 
own citizenship. But for unmarried citizen 
mothers, the State Department's practice 
since at least 1912 was to grant citizenship to 
their foreign-born children on the theory that 
an unmarried mother “stands in the place of 
the father” and is in any event “bound to 
maintain [the child] as its natural guardian.”  
 
In 1940 Congress for the first time explicitly 
addressed the situation of children born out 
of wedlock. It enacted Section 205 of the 
1940 Act, which provided that citizen fathers 
and married citizen mothers could transmit 
citizenship to their child born abroad only 
after satisfying an age-calibrated ten-year 
physical presence requirement, but that 
unmarried citizen mothers could confer 
citizenship if they had resided in the United 
States at any point prior to the child's birth. 
The 1952 Act retained this basic statutory 
structure, though it imposed a somewhat 
more stringent requirement that unmarried 
mothers have been physically present in the 
United States for a continuous period of one 
year in order to confer citizenship.  
Neither the congressional hearings nor the 
relevant congressional reports concerning the 
1940 Act contain any reference to the 
problem of statelessness for children born 
abroad. The congressional hearings 
concerning the 1952 Act are similarly silent 
about statelessness as a driving concern.10 
Notwithstanding the absence of relevant 
discussion concerning the problem of 
statelessness for children born abroad in the 
legislative history, the Government points to 
the Executive Branch's explanatory 
comments to Section 204 of the proposed 
nationality code that Congress would 
ultimately enact as the 1940 Act. These 
comments refer to a 1935 law review article 
entitled A Comparative Study of Laws 
Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of 
Nationality by Durward V. Sandifer. 
According to the article, in 1935 
approximately thirty countries had statutes 
assigning children born out of wedlock the 
citizenship of their mother. From the 
comments and the article, the Government 
urges us to infer that “Congress was aware” 
there existed “a substantial risk that a child 
born to an unwed U.S. citizen mother in a 
country employing [laws determining 
citizenship based on lineage, rather than 
place of birth] would be stateless at birth 
unless the mother could pass her citizenship 
to her child,” and that this risk was “unique” 
to the children of unwed citizen mothers.  
 
Based on our review of the Executive 
Branch's explanatory comments and the 
Sandifer article, we decline the Government's 
invitation. The explanatory comments do not 
mention statelessness and do not refer to the 
Sandifer article's discussion of statelessness. 
In any event, the Sandifer article itself does 
not support the Government's argument that 
the children of unwed citizen mothers faced a 
greater risk of statelessness than the children 
of unwed citizen fathers. 
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While the Executive Branch's comments 
ignore the problem of statelessness, they 
arguably reflect gender-based generalizations 
concerning who would care for and be 
associated with a child born out of wedlock. 
Other contemporary administrative 
memoranda similarly ignore the risk of 
statelessness for children born out of wedlock 
abroad to citizen mothers. 
 
In sum, we discern no evidence (1) that 
Congress enacted the 1952 Act's gender-
based physical presence requirements out of 
a concern for statelessness, (2) that the 
problem of statelessness was in fact greater 
for children of unwed citizen mothers than 
for children of unwed citizen fathers, or (3) 
that Congress believed that the problem of 
statelessness was greater for children of 
unwed citizen mothers than for children of 
unwed citizen fathers. We conclude that 
neither reason nor history supports the 
Government's contention that the 1952 Act's 
gender-based physical presence requirements 
were motivated by a concern for 
statelessness, as opposed to impermissible 
stereotyping. 
 
b. Substantial Relationship Between Ends 
and Means 
 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that 
preventing statelessness was Congress's 
actual motivating concern when it enacted 
the physical presence requirements, we are 
persuaded by the availability of effective 
gender-neutral alternatives that the gender-
based distinction between § 1409(a) 
(incorporating § 1401(a)(7)) and § 1409(c) 
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny. As far 
back as 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
proposed just such a gender-neutral 
alternative in a letter to the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization. Secretary Hull suggested that 
the immigration laws be revised “to obtain 
the objective of parity between the sexes in 
nationality matters” by “remov [ing] ... 
discrimination between” mothers and fathers 
“with regard to the transmission of 
citizenship to children born abroad.” Hull 
proposed the following language: 
 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT ... 
 
(d) A child hereafter born out of 
wedlock beyond the limits and 
jurisdiction of the United States and 
its outlying possessions to an 
American parent who has resided in 
the United States and its outlying 
possessions, there being no other 
legal parent under the law of the place 
of birth, shall have the nationality of 
such American parent. 
 
And unlike the legitimation requirement at 
issue in Nguyen, which could be satisfied by, 
for example, “a written acknowledgment of 
paternity under oath,” the physical presence 
requirement that Morales–Santana 
challenges imposes more than a “minimal” 
burden on unwed citizen fathers. It adds to 
the legitimation requirement ten years of 
physical presence in the United States, five of 
which must be after the age of fourteen. In 
our view, this burden on a citizen father's 
right to confer citizenship on his foreign-born 
child is substantial. 
 
For these reasons, the gender-based 
distinction at the heart of the 1952 Act's 
physical presence requirements is not 
substantially related to the achievement of a 
permissible, non-stereotype-based objective. 
 
3. Remedy 
 
We now turn to the most vexing problem in 
this case. Here, two statutory provisions— § 
1409(c) and (a)18—combine to violate equal 
protection. What is the remedy for this 
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violation of equal protection, where 
citizenship is at stake? Ordinarily, “when the 
‘right invoked is that to equal treatment,’ the 
appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal 
treatment, a result that can be accomplished 
by withdrawal of benefits from the favored 
class as well as by extension of benefits to the 
excluded class.”  
 
As we see it, “equal treatment” might be 
achieved in any one of three ways: (1) 
striking both § 1409(c) and (a) entirely; (2) 
severing the one-year continuous presence 
provision in § 1409(c) and requiring every 
unwed citizen parent to satisfy the more 
onerous ten-year requirement if the other 
parent lacks citizenship; or (3) severing the 
ten-year requirement in §§ 1409(a) and 
1401(a)(7) and requiring every unwed citizen 
parent to satisfy the less onerous one-year 
continuous presence requirement if the other 
parent lacks citizenship. In selecting among 
these three options, we look to the intent of 
Congress in enacting the 1952 Act. For 
reasons we explain below, we conclude that 
the third option is most consistent with 
congressional intent. 
 
We eliminate the first option with ease. The 
1952 Act contains a severance clause that 
provides: “If any particular provision of this 
Act, or the application thereof to any person 
or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of the Act ... shall not be affected 
thereby.” The clause makes clear that only 
one of the provisions in § 1409, rather than 
both, should be severed as constitutionally 
infirm. It also means that our holding, which 
relates only to the application of these 
provisions to unmarried parents, should not 
be construed to affect the physical presence 
requirement for married parents. 
 
We reject the second option—contracting, as 
opposed to extending, the right to derivative 
citizenship—with more circumspection. The 
Government urges us to adopt this option, 
arguing that the alternative allows the 
exception for unwed mothers to swallow the 
rule, thereby inflicting more damage to the 
statute's language and structure and reflecting 
a more radical change than the 1952 
Congress intended. This argument fails for 
two reasons. First, the argument 
misunderstands our task, which is not to 
devise the “cleanest” way to alter the wording 
and structure of the statute, but to determine 
what result Congress intended in the event 
the combined statutory provisions were 
deemed unconstitutional. Second, the 
Government's argument neglects the 
historical background against which 
Congress enacted the relevant provisions. 
Although a close call, history does not 
convince us that the members of Congress 
passing the 1952 Act would have viewed the 
extension of the one-year requirement as a 
more radical change than the alternative, in 
which all unwed citizen parents must satisfy 
the ten-year age-calibrated requirement if the 
other parent lacks citizenship. To the 
contrary, the ten-year requirement for fathers 
and married mothers imposed by Congress in 
1940 appears to have represented a 
significant departure from long-established 
historical practice. From 1934 until the 
enactment of the 1940 Act, for example, 
women had the statutory right to confer 
citizenship on their foreign-born children and 
were required merely to have resided in the 
United States for any duration prior to the 
child's birth. The same bare-minimum 
requirement applied to men for the vast 
majority of the time since the founding, from 
1790 until 1940. Moreover, the 1952 Act's 
addition of a one-year continuous physical 
presence requirement for unmarried citizen 
mothers represented a relatively minor 
change in the baseline minimal residency 
requirement applicable to all men and women 
prior to 1940. On the other hand, of course, 
we recognize that the 1952 Congress, 
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presumably with the benefit of this long 
history, nevertheless decided to retain the 
ten-year residency requirement. Whether this 
related to the emergence of the United States 
as a world power after World War II or an 
increasing number of children born of mixed-
nationality parents, or some other set of 
factors, we cannot tell with confidence. 
 
Neither the text nor the legislative history of 
the 1952 Act is especially helpful or clear on 
this point, and ultimately what tips the 
balance for us is the binding precedent that 
cautions us to extend rather than contract 
benefits in the face of ambiguous 
congressional intent. Indeed, we are unaware 
of a single case in which the Supreme Court 
has contracted, rather than extended, benefits 
when curing an equal protection violation 
through severance. 
 
Lastly, the Government contends that, in 
giving Morales–Santana the relief he seeks, 
we are granting citizenship, which we lack 
the power to do. This argument rests on a 
mistaken premise. Although courts have no 
power to confer “citizenship on a basis other 
than that prescribed by Congress,” Morales–
Santana has not asked us to confer 
citizenship, and we do not do so. Instead, 
Morales–Santana asks that we exercise our 
traditional remedial powers “so that the 
statute, free of its constitutional defect, can 
operate to determine whether citizenship was 
transmitted at birth.” In other words, if 
Morales–Santana “were to prevail, the 
judgment in [his] favor would confirm [his] 
pre-existing citizenship rather than grant 
[him] rights that [he] does not now possess.” 
Correcting the constitutional defect here 
would at a minimum entail replacing the ten-
year physical presence requirement in § 
1401(a)(7) (and incorporated within § 
1409(a)) with the one-year continuous 
presence requirement in § 1409(c). The 
alternative remedy suggested by the 
Government—that all unwed parents be 
subject to the more onerous ten-year 
requirement—would prove no less 
controversial: we have no more power to strip 
citizenship conferred by Congress than to 
confer it. Nor, finally, has Congress 
authorized us to avoid the question. 
Conforming the immigration laws Congress 
enacted with the Constitution's guarantee of 
equal protection, we conclude that Morales–
Santana is a citizen as of his birth. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the 
BIA's decision and REMAND for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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“Gender-Based Citizenship Law Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review” 
 
Bloomberg 
Greg Stohr 
June 28, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider the 
constitutionality of a provision in federal law 
that makes it harder for some foreign-born 
children of American men to become citizens 
than children born abroad to American 
women. 
The nation’s highest court agreed to hear the 
Obama administration’s appeal of a ruling 
that conferred citizenship on Luis Ramon 
Morales-Santana, a man born in the 
Dominican Republic who was facing 
deportation after being convicted of a 1995 
robbery and attempted murder in New York. 
Under federal law, a child born abroad to an 
unmarried American mother and non-
American father can claim U.S. citizenship if 
the mother lived continuously in the U.S. for 
a year at some point before the birth. The 
residency requirements are more stringent if 
the father is American and the mother isn’t. 
A New York-based federal appeals court said 
the distinction amounted to unconstitutional 
discrimination on the basis of gender. The 
panel said Morales-Santana, born in 1962 to 
a Dominican mother and a American father, 
was entitled to invoke the more lenient rules 
that would have applied had his mother been 
the U.S. citizen. 
The Supreme Court tried and failed to resolve 
the issue five years ago, splitting 4-4 in a 
similar case. Justice Elena Kagan wasn’t able 
to take part in that dispute, presumably 
because she had been involved as an Obama 
administration lawyer. 
The new case is Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 
15-1191. 
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“Supreme Court citizenship case: Should the genders of parents' 
matter?” 
 
Christian Science Monitor 
Christina Beck 
June 28, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court announced Tuesday that 
it will consider whether or not United States 
citizenship law that favors children of unwed 
American mothers over those with unwed 
American fathers is a gender-based violation 
of the US Constitution's equal rights 
provision. 
If children born abroad have unwed parents, 
and only one is an American citizen, current 
immigration law gives different treatment 
depending on the gender of the American 
parent. Despite attempts at reform, children 
of unwed American mothers today have an 
easier time gaining US citizenship than the 
children of American fathers. 
This disparity will come before the court 
through the case of Luis Ramon Morales-
Santana, the son of an American citizen 
father, who was denied American citizenship.  
Under current law, American fathers are 
required to spend at least five years living in 
the United States before their children born 
abroad and out of wedlock are allowed to 
seek citizenship. (A 2012 amendment 
lowered the time requirement from ten 
years.) American women, however, are only 
required to prove that they have lived in the 
United States for one year before their 
children can seek citizenship. 
In July 2015, the second US Court of Appeals 
in New York struck down the law, saying that 
the rule was an example of "impermissible 
stereotyping," and that it imposed an unfair 
burden on fathers. After the US Justice 
Department's loss at the appellate level in 
New York, the department took the case to 
the Supreme Court. 
Since 2000, the US has been trying to deport 
Mr. Morales-Santana, who was born in 1962 
in the Dominican Republic and has legally 
lived in the US since 1975. In 1995, he was 
convicted of four counts of attempted murder 
and two counts of robbery. 
Morales-Santana’s now-deceased father 
missed the five year residency cut off by just 
twenty days, he said. His parents married in 
1970. Morales-Santana argues that his father 
should have legally been considered a 
resident for the entire five year period, 
including his time in the Dominican 
Republic, since he was working for a US-
owned company. In 2015, the 2nd Court of 
Appeals in New York rejected his four 
arguments for derivative citizenship. 
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He had also claimed, however, that the 
different rules for mothers' and fathers' 
residence in the US violated his father's right 
to equal protection. The court ruled that the 
1952 Nationality Act’s different gender-
based residency requirements did nothing to 
advance the government’s stated interests 
with the Act: avoiding statelessness and 
ensuring a sufficient connection between 
citizen children and the United States. 
Critics of the 2nd Circuit Court’s decision 
argue that the Constitution’s Equal Protection 
clause should not apply to foreign citizens, 
saying that Congress has the right to establish 
any rule it wants regarding the residency 
requirements for US citizens and their 
offspring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative critics also say that this 
decision could be a slippery slope, leading to 
widespread judicial amnesty for non-citizens. 
The Supreme Court will hear the case in the 
next cycle, and will issue a ruling before June 
2017. The last time the court ruled on a 
similar case it came to a split 4-4 decision 
after Justice Elena Kagan recused herself, 
likely because of her previous position in the 
Justice Department.
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Birthright Citizenship Case” 
 
Jackson Lewis Immigration Blog 
Maggie Murphy 
June 28, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide 
whether a man born outside the U.S., out of 
wedlock, to a U.S. citizen father and a 
noncitizen mother could benefit from 
birthright citizenship. A decision in this case 
can mean protection from deportation for 
many. Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d 
520 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted (U.S. June 
28, 2016) (No. 15-1191). 
Birthright citizenship laws have changed 
throughout the years, and when deciding 
whether someone is entitled to citizenship by 
birth, one must review the laws in place at the 
time of his birth. Luis Ramon Morales-
Santana was born outside the U.S. to unwed 
parents – his mother was a noncitizen and his 
father was a U.S. citizen. At that time, the 
laws in place prohibited the transmission of 
citizenship to Morales-Santana by his U.S. 
citizen father. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in New York, granted Morales-
Santana citizenship, ruling that fathers should 
have the same benefits as mothers under the 
statute. The Court held that the citizenship 
rule applied “archaic and overbroad 
stereotypes” to parenting roles for children 
born to unwed parents and violated equal 
protection rights. The U.S. Department of 
Justice asked the Supreme Court to reverse 
this opinion, arguing that a court cannot 
create new citizenship rules and regulations. 
Citizenship laws can be very confusing. 
Under current citizenship laws for children 
born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father 
and a noncitizen mother, the child benefits 
from birthright citizenship if the father is 
physically present in the U.S. five years prior 
to the child’s birth, two of which are after the 
age of 14 (military service counts). The child 
can also benefit from birthright citizenship if 
a blood relationship is established, the father 
agrees to support the child until he or she is 
18, and, while the child is under 18, one of 
three factors is met: (1) the child is 
legitimated; (2) the father acknowledges 
paternity; or (3) paternity is established by 
court adjudication. 
The Supreme Court reviewed a similar case 
several years ago, when the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San 
Francisco, upheld the citizenship 
transmission rules. At that time, Justice Elena 
Kagan had to recuse herself, and the decision 
was 4 – 4. 
Jackson Lewis will report on the Supreme 
Court’s decision, expected by June 2017. If 
the Court upholds the Second Circuit 
decision, ruling in favor of equal protection 
for fathers, it could result in citizenship rights 
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for thousands of individuals born abroad to 
U.S. citizen fathers and may provide 
remedies to individuals currently facing 
deportation.
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“2nd Circ. Axes Citizenship Rule Weighted Against Fathers” 
 
Law360 
Allissa Wickham 
July 8, 2015 
 
The Second Circuit ruled Wednesday that 
strict citizenship requirements for a child 
born outside the U.S. to an unmarried citizen 
father and non‐citizen mother ran afoul of the 
Fifth Amendment, finding that a green card 
holder fighting deportation had actually 
derived citizenship at birth through his father. 
A three-judge panel for the Second Circuit, 
which included U.S. District Judge Jed 
Rakoff sitting by designation, found that 
petitioner Luis Ramon Morales‐Santana is a 
citizen by birth, and reversed the Board of 
Immigration Appeals' denial of his bid to 
reopen removal proceedings. 
The case deals with a gender discrepancy 
between how citizenship is given to children 
born abroad to unwed parents, based on 
whether the mother or father was a non-
citizen. 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952, which was the law in effect when 
Morales‐Santana was born, a child born 
outside the U.S. to an unmarried citizen 
mother and non‐citizen father has citizenship 
at birth if the mother was present in the U.S. 
or one of its territories for a continuous period 
of at least a year before the child was born, 
according to the Second Circuit. 
However, if child’s parents are an unwed 
citizen father and non‐citizen mother, he has 
citizenship only if the dad was present in the 
U.S. or related territory before the child was 
born for at least 10 years, with at least five of 
those years occurring after age of 14, the 
court said. 
Morales‐Santana, whose dad satisfied the 
citizenship conferral requirements for 
unmarried mothers but not for fathers, 
claimed this gendered difference violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection, and claimed unwed fathers should 
have the same benefits given to unwed 
mothers under the statute. The Second Circuit 
panel agreed, in an opinion authored by 
Circuit Judge Raymond Lohier Jr. 
“We agree and hold that Morales‐Santana 
derived citizenship at birth through his 
father,” Lohier wrote. 
Morales‐Santana was born in the Dominican 
Republic in 1962 and is the child of a U.S. 
citizen father and a Dominican mother. 
Although he entered the U.S. as a green card 
holder in 1975, he was placed in deportation 
proceedings in 2000 after having been 
convicted of felonies, the court said. 
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Although he applied for withholding of 
removal based on derivative citizenship 
secured through his father, Morales‐Santana 
was rebuffed by both an immigration judge 
and the BIA. 
According to Morales‐Santana’s attorney, 
Stephen Broome of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart 
& Sullivan LLP, his client was initially 
proceeding before the appeals court pro se, 
before Broome was appointed to the case. 
Broome described the litigation as “hard-
fought,” with briefings that cited letters of 
executive agencies going back to the 1920s. 
“When you’re challenging an immigration 
statute under the equal protection clause, I 
think ... that’s an uphill battle, but I think the 
result they reached is 100 percent right,” 
Broome said, adding that he was “thrilled” 
with the decision. 
Broome said the current version of the INA is 
still discriminatory in that unwed citizen 
mothers face a one-year physical 
requirement, while unwed citizen fathers face 
an age-calibrated presence requirement that 
is much higher. 
Although the court was only analyzing the 
version of the INA that was in effect when 
Morales‐Santana was born, its reasoning 
would apply equally to the current law, 
according to Broome. 
Notably, the Second Circuit’s decision 
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s 2008 
holding in Flores‐Villar, which upheld the 
residence requirements on U.S. citizen 
fathers’ ability to transmit citizenship to kids 
born abroad outside of marriage to a non-
citizen. 
As Broome pointed out, that ruling was 
ultimately upheld in a 4-4 Supreme Court 
decision after Justice Elena Kagan recused 
herself, possibly because she was solicitor 
general at the time of the Ninth Circuit 
appeal. Having not definitively ruled on the 
issue and now facing a circuit split, the high 
court may be tempted to take up this case if 
the government should appeal, Broome said. 
A representative for the U.S. Department of 
Justice did not respond to a request for 
comment Wednesday. 
Morales‐Santana is represented by Stephen 
Broome and Todd Anten of Quinn Emanuel 
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, who handled the 
case pro bono. 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch is 
represented by Kathryn M. McKinney, 
Janette L. Allen and Imran Raza Zaidi of the 
U.S. Department of Justice. 
The case is Morales-Santana v. Lynch, case 
number 11-1252, at the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
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United States v. Texas 
15-674 
Ruling Below: Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) 
Several states sought injunctive relief against the implementation of Deferred Action for Parents 
of Americans and Lawful permanent Residents and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. The 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted preliminary injunctive relief on the 
grounds that implementation would likely violate the Administrative Procedure Act. The 
government appealed and filed for a stay or narrowing of scope. The Court of Appeals denied the 
motion, then later issued a holding. The CoA held that states had special solicitude in 
determining Article III standing, that Texas satisfied injury element for Art. III standing, that 
review was available under the Administrative Procedure Act, that Texas was likely to succeed 
on merits of claim with regards to policy-directive exemption and agency-rule exemption under 
the APA and on merits of substantive APA claim. Thus, preliminary injunction was warranted. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals due to a split 4-4 decision. The 
US Department of Justice has asked the Supreme Court to rehear the case, on the grounds that a 
definitive decision by a full Court is necessary.  
Question Presented: Whether a state that voluntarily provides a subsidy to all aliens with 
deferred action has Article III standing and a justiciable cause of action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the Secretary of Homeland Security’s guidance seeking to 
establish a process for considering deferred action for certain aliens because it will lead to more 
aliens having deferred action; whether the guidance is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not 
in accordance with law; whether the guidance was subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment 
procedures; and whether the guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Article 
II, section 3. 
 
UNITED STATES, et al., Petitioners 
v. 
TEXAS, et al. 
 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Decided on June 23, 2016 
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. 
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“White House Asks Supreme Court for New Review of Immigration 
Policy With 9 Justices” 
 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jess Bravin 
July 18, 2016 
 
The Obama administration moved Monday to 
expedite future Supreme Court review of its 
immigration policy, asking the court to rehear 
the issue as soon as a ninth justice is seated. 
Last month the Supreme Court deadlocked 4-
4 over the administration’s appeal of lower 
court orders that stymied its plans to grant 
work authorization to more than four million 
illegal immigrants whose children are U.S. 
citizens or lawful residents. The tie vote left 
intact a decision of the Fifth U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in New Orleans, which 
froze the plan while a Texas-led coalition of 
Republican-leaning states pursued litigation 
contending the program exceeds the 
administration’s authority. 
The immigration case was one of four 
Supreme Court deadlocks since the February 
death of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia. 
President Barack Obama nominated U.S. 
Judge Merrick Garland to replace Justice 
Scalia. But Senate Republicans have declined 
to act on the nomination and said the decision 
should wait for the next president. 
The request, made in a motion for rehearing, 
could allow the case to return to the Supreme 
Court’s docket more quickly than waiting for 
the litigation to make a second journey 
through federal trial and appellate courts. 
In its petition, the Justice Department 
acknowledged that “ordinarily, it is 
exceedingly rare for this Court to grant 
rehearing” after a decision has been issued. 
But it said that on several occasions the court 
has agreed to rehear a case when a deadlock 
was caused by a temporary vacancy. 
“In such situations, the court has not 
infrequently held the case over the court’s 
summer recess, holding oral arguments 
months later,” the department said. 
For example, after Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
died in 1938, the court deadlocked in a case 
concerning the seizure of an automobile that 
illegally transported liquor. The court granted 
the government’s petition for rehearing, 
“then heard the case after Justice [Felix] 
Frankfurter was confirmed” the following 
year. 
The Justice Department said it was more 
important to rehear the immigration case than 
the other 2016 deadlocks, because of its 
national importance and the fact that the issue 
couldn’t return to the court in different cases 
filed by private parties. 
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“Unless the court resolves this case in a 
precedential manner, a matter of ‘great 
national importance’ involving an 
‘unprecedented and momentous’ injunction 
barring implementation of the [immigration 
policy] will have been effectively resolved 
for the country as a whole by a court of 
appeals that has divided twice,” the Justice 
Department said. 
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“Obama administration asks Supreme Court to reconsider immigration 
plan” 
 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
July 18, 2016 
 
The Obama administration asked the 
Supreme Court Monday to reconsider the 
president’s plan to shield millions of 
undocumented immigrants from deportation 
once the court again has nine members. 
The court last month said it was split 4 to 4 
on whether lower courts were correct when 
they blocked implementation of President 
Obama’s plan, which he announced in 2014 
after Congress failed to pass comprehensive 
immigration reform. Obama’s plan would 
have shielded those who have been in the 
country for years without committing serious 
crimes and have family ties to those here 
legally. 
The request is a long shot, and Acting 
Solicitor General Ian Heath Gershengorn 
acknowledged in the filing that it is 
“exceedingly rare” for the court to grant such 
a petition. 
But the action draws attention to the fact that 
the Republican Senate has not agreed to a 
hearing or vote on Judge Merrick Garland, 
Obama’s nominee to fill the seat of Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who died in February. 
The petition said an issue as important as 
immigration should not be decided by lower 
courts without definitive Supreme Court 
review. 
But the court itself could have held the case 
for a rehearing and decided not to. 
And as a practical matter, it will be the next 
president who decides either to endorse or 
even expand Obama’s executive action, as 
Democrat Hillary Clinton has said she will 
do, or end it, as Republican Donald Trump 
has vowed.
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 “Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak and Michael D. Shear 
June 23, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court announced on Thursday 
that it had deadlocked in a case challenging 
President Obama’s immigration plan, 
effectively ending what Mr. Obama had 
hoped would become one of his central 
legacies. The program would have shielded 
as many as five million undocumented 
immigrants from deportation and allowed 
them to legally work in the United States. 
The 4-4 tie, which left in place an appeals 
court ruling blocking the plan, amplified the 
contentious election-year debate over the 
nation’s immigration policy and presidential 
power. 
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
case in January, it seemed poised to issue a 
major ruling on presidential power. That did 
not materialize, but the court’s action, which 
established no precedent and included no 
reasoning, was nonetheless perhaps its most 
important statement this term. 
The decision was just nine words long: “The 
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided 
court.” 
But its consequences will be vast, said Walter 
Dellinger, who was acting solicitor general in 
the Clinton administration. “Seldom have the 
hopes of so many been crushed by so few 
words,” he said. 
The president spoke after the 4-4 ruling by 
the Supreme Court on Thursday that deals a 
blow to his plan to spare millions of illegal 
immigrants from deportation.  
Speaking at the White House, Mr. Obama 
described the ruling as a deep disappointment 
for immigrants who would not be able to 
emerge from the threat of deportation for at 
least the balance of his term. 
“Today’s decision is frustrating to those who 
seek to grow our economy and bring a 
rationality to our immigration system,” he 
said before heading to the West Coast for a 
two-day trip. “It is heartbreaking for the 
millions of immigrants who have made their 
lives here.” 
The decision was one of two determined by 
tie votes Thursday — the other concerned 
Indian tribal courts — and one of four so far 
this term. The court is scheduled to issue its 
final three decisions of the term, including 
one on a restrictive Texas abortion law, on 
Monday. 
Mr. Obama said the court’s immigration 
ruling was a stark reminder of the 
consequences of Republicans’ refusal to 
consider Judge Merrick B. Garland, the 
president’s nominee to fill the vacancy on the 
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Supreme Court created by the death of Justice 
Antonin Scalia. 
“If you keep on blocking judges from getting 
on the bench, then courts can’t issue 
decisions,” Mr. Obama said. “And what that 
means is then you are going to have the status 
quo frozen, and we are not able to make 
progress on some very important issues.” 
The case, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, 
concerned a 2014 executive action by the 
president to allow as many as five million 
unauthorized immigrants who were the 
parents of citizens or of lawful permanent 
residents to apply for a program that would 
spare them from deportation and provide 
them with work permits. The program was 
called Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents, 
or DAPA. 
Mr. Obama has said he took the action after 
years of frustration with Republicans in 
Congress who had repeatedly refused to 
support bipartisan Senate legislation to 
update immigration laws. A coalition of 26 
states, led by Texas, promptly challenged the 
plan, accusing the president of ignoring 
administrative procedures for changing rules 
and of abusing the power of his office by 
circumventing Congress. 
“Today’s decision keeps in place what we 
have maintained from the very start: One 
person, even a president, cannot unilaterally 
change the law,” Ken Paxton, the Texas 
attorney general, said in a statement after the 
ruling. “This is a major setback to President 
Obama’s attempts to expand executive 
power, and a victory for those who believe in 
the separation of powers and the rule of law.” 
The court did not disclose how the justices 
had voted, but they were almost certainly 
split along ideological lines. Administration 
officials had hoped that Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. would join the court’s four-
member liberal wing to save the program. 
The case hinged in part on whether Texas had 
suffered the sort of direct and concrete injury 
that gave it standing to sue. Texas said it had 
standing because it would be costly for the 
state to give driver’s licenses to immigrants 
affected by the federal policy. 
Chief Justice Roberts is often skeptical of 
expansive standing arguments. But it seemed 
plain when the case was argued in April that 
he was satisfied that Texas had standing, 
paving the way for a deadlock. 
Mr. Obama said the White House did not 
believe the terse ruling from the court had any 
effect on the president’s authority to act 
unilaterally. But he said the practical effect 
would be to freeze his efforts on behalf of 
immigrants until after the November 
election. 
He also predicted that lawmakers would 
eventually act to overhaul the nation’s 
immigration system. 
“Congress is not going to be able to ignore 
America forever,” he said. “It’s not a matter 
of if; it’s a matter of when. We get these 
spasms of politics around immigration and 
fear-mongering, and then our traditions and 
our history and our better impulses kick in.” 
White House officials had repeatedly argued 
that presidents in both parties had used 
similar executive authority in applying the 
nation’s immigration laws. And they said 
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Congress had granted federal law 
enforcement wide discretion over how those 
laws should be carried out. 
But the court’s ruling may mean that the next 
president will again need to seek a 
congressional compromise to overhaul the 
nation’s immigration laws. And it left 
immigration activists deeply disappointed. 
“This is personal,” Rocio Saenz, the 
executive vice president of the Service 
Employees International Union, said in a 
statement. “We will remain at the front lines, 
committed to defending the immigration 
initiatives and paving the path to lasting 
immigration reform.” 
The lower court rulings in the case were 
provisional, and the litigation will now 
continue and may again reach the Supreme 
Court when it is back at full strength. In the 
meantime, it seems unlikely that the program 
will be revived. 
In February 2015, Judge Andrew S. Hanen of 
Federal District Court in Brownsville, Tex., 
entered a preliminary injunction shutting 
down the program while the legal case 
proceeded. The government appealed, and a 
divided three-judge panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in New Orleans affirmed the injunction. 
In their Supreme Court briefs, the states 
acknowledged that the president had wide 
authority over immigration matters, telling 
the justices that “the executive does have 
enforcement discretion to forbear from 
removing aliens on an individual basis.” 
Their quarrel, they said, was with what they 
called a blanket grant of “lawful presence” to 
millions of immigrants, entitling them to 
various benefits. 
In response, Solicitor General Donald B. 
Verrilli Jr. told the justices that this “lawful 
presence” was merely what had always 
followed from the executive branch’s 
decision not to deport someone for a given 
period of time. 
“Deferred action does not provide these 
individuals with any lawful status under the 
immigration laws,” he said. “But it provides 
some measure of dignity and decent 
treatment.” 
“It recognizes the damage that would be 
wreaked by tearing apart families,” Mr. 
Verrilli added, “and it allows individuals to 
leave the shadow economy and work on the 
books to provide for their families, thereby 
reducing exploitation and distortion in our 
labor markets.” 
The states said they had suffered the sort of 
direct and concrete injury that gave them 
standing to sue. 
Judge Jerry E. Smith, writing for the majority 
in the appeals court, focused on an injury said 
to have been suffered by Texas, which he said 
would have to spend millions of dollars to 
provide driver’s licenses to immigrants as a 
consequence of the federal program. 
Mr. Verrilli told the justices that Texas’ 
injury was self-inflicted, a product of its 
decision to offer driver’s licenses for less 
than they cost to produce and to tie eligibility 
for them to federal standards. 
Texas responded that being required to 
change its laws was itself the sort of harm that 
conferred standing. “Such a forced change in 
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Texas law would impair Texas’ sovereign 
interest in ‘the power to create and enforce a 
legal code,’” the state’s lawyers wrote in a 
brief. 
Judge Hanen grounded his injunction on the 
Obama administration’s failure to give notice 
and seek public comments on its new 
program. He found that notice and comment 
were required because the program gave 
blanket relief to entire categories of people, 
notwithstanding the administration’s 
assertion that it required case-by-case 
determinations about who was eligible for the 
program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The appeals court affirmed that ruling and 
added a broader one. The program, it said, 
also exceeded Mr. Obama’s statutory 
authority.
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“Obama's immigration plan appears to be in trouble after Supreme Court 
hearing” 
 
The Los Angeles Times 
David G. Savage 
April 18, 2016 
 
President Obama's far-reaching plan to ease 
life for millions of immigrants in the U.S. 
illegally ran into solid conservative 
opposition at the Supreme Court on Monday, 
putting its fate in doubt. 
The administration’s supporters were left to 
hope that justices — evenly divided between 
Republican and Democratic appointees since 
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia — might 
dismiss the Texas case on a legal technicality 
by finding the state of Texas cannot show it 
would be sufficiently harmed by the 
president’s program. 
But the comments and questions during 
Monday’s argument suggested the court’s 
four conservatives probably would side with 
Texas and 25 other Republican-led states, 
while the four liberals would vote to uphold 
Obama’s plan. 
If so, the 4-4 split would be a defeat for the 
administration, keeping in place a federal 
judge’s order that has blocked the plan from 
taking effect. 
At issue is whether the president has the 
authority to temporarily remove the threat of 
deportation and offer a work permit to more 
than 4 million immigrant parents of children 
who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent 
residents. 
Obama’s lawyers argued that U.S. 
immigration laws give the chief executive 
broad leeway in deciding whom to deport, 
including the authority to take no action 
against millions of working immigrants who 
have families here and no serious criminal 
records. 
But in the opening minutes of arguments 
Monday, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. 
and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said 
Obama’s order appeared to go further by in 
effect changing the law and reclassifying 
millions of immigrants so that they may stay 
and work legally in the U.S. 
Roberts asked the president’s attorney 
whether there were any limits to executive 
authority when it comes to deportation. 
“Could the president grant deferred removal 
to every unlawfully present alien in the 
United States?” Roberts asked. 
No, replied U.S. Solicitor Gen. Donald 
Verrilli Jr., noting that the law still calls for 
arresting criminals. 
“OK. So not criminals. Who else?” Roberts 
continued. 
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Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. interjected to say 
that, under the administration’s legal theory, 
a future president might decide unilaterally 
on an “open borders” policy, regardless of 
what Congress decided. 
Verrilli disagreed. “That’s a million miles 
from where we are now,” he said. 
Kennedy, whose vote is seen as crucial for 
the administration, leaned forward. “Well, 
it’s 4 million people from where we are 
now,” he said. “What we’re doing is defining 
the limits of discretion. And it seems to me 
that is a legislative, not executive, act.” 
Allowing the president to take the lead in 
defining which immigrants can stay is 
“backward,” Kennedy said. “The president is 
setting the policy and Congress is executing 
it. That’s just upside down.” 
The sharp exchange served notice that the 
court’s conservatives are unlikely to uphold 
Obama’s order as being within his executive 
authority. 
The administration’s fallback argument is 
that the case should be dismissed because 
Texas suffered no injury and therefore has no 
standing to sue. The state has complained it 
must shoulder the cost of issuing driver’s 
licenses to the immigrants. 
Roberts, who has been skeptical of granting 
standing to states to challenge federal 
policies, said Texas looked to have a real 
complaint. “Texas says: Our injury is we 
have to give driver’s license here, and that 
costs us money,” the chief justice told 
Verrilli. 
Standing is sometimes a wild card in cases 
over which the justices are deeply divided. 
In 2004, eight justices were split over 
whether public schools could have students 
recite the phrase “one nation under God” in 
the Pledge of Allegiance. Scalia had recused 
himself, and a tie vote would have affirmed 
the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling 
that the practice was unconstitutional. 
Instead, the justices defused the controversy 
by deciding that Michael Newdow, the father 
who sued on his daughter’s behalf, did not 
have standing. 
The most important recent test of a state’s 
standing came in 2007 when Massachusetts, 
California and a coalition of “blue states” 
sued the George W. Bush administration for 
failing to take action on climate change under 
the Clean Air Act. By a 5-4 vote, the court’s 
liberals, joined by Kennedy, upheld the 
state’s claim on the theory that rising seas 
could damage their coastlines. 
Roberts dissented in that case, but he 
mentioned the ruling twice Monday. “We 
said in Massachusetts vs. EPA that we have a 
special solicitude for claims of the states,” he 
said, a comment that suggested he was not 
ready to throw out the Texas case on 
standing. 
Thomas Saenz, president of the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, joined Verrilli in support of Obama’s 
order, known as Deferred Action for Parents 
of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents, or DAPA. He said he was there on 
behalf of three Texas mothers who seek 
“relief from the daily fear they will be 
separated from their families and detained or 
removed from their homes.” 
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Arguing on the other side, Texas Solicitor 
Gen. Scott Keller called Obama’s order an 
“unprecedented unlawful assertion of 
executive power” and potentially “one of the 
largest changes in immigration policy in our 
nation’s history.” 
He ran into sharp questions from the court’s 
liberal justices. They steadily defended the 
president’s executive action and said it was 
consistent with past presidents who extended 
relief to large groups of immigrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“We still go back to the basic problem: 11.3 
million people,” said Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg. Congress has not appropriated the 
money to arrest and deport millions of 
otherwise law-abiding immigrants, she said, 
so it makes sense to allow some of them to 
work legally and raise families. 
The justices will meet this week to discuss the 
case and vote on whether to affirm or reverse 
the lower court. A decision is likely to be 
announced in June.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to decide major case on Obama immigration plan” 
 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
January 19, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday paved 
the way for a major ruling on the limits of 
presidential powers, agreeing to decide the 
legality of President Barack Obama's 
unilateral action to shield more than 4 million 
illegal immigrants from deportation. 
The court agreed to hear Obama's bid to 
resurrect his plan, undertaken in 2014 
through executive action bypassing the 
Republican-led Congress, that was blocked 
last year by lower courts after Texas and 25 
other Republican-governed states sued to 
stop it. A ruling is due by the end of June. 
The case is not the first time Obama has 
asked the Supreme Court to rescue a major 
initiative. The court in 2012 and 2015 
rejected conservative challenges to his 
signature healthcare law. 
The White House expressed confidence the 
court would now deem as lawful Obama's 
immigration action, which was crafted to let 
millions of illegal immigrants whose children 
are American citizens or lawful permanent 
residents to get into a program that protects 
them from deportation and supplies work 
permits. 
Texas and the other states contend Obama 
exceeded his presidential powers and usurped 
the authority of Congress. Texas Attorney 
General Ken Paxton, a Republican, said 
courts have long recognized the limits to 
presidential authority. 
"The court should affirm what President 
Obama said himself on more than 20 
occasions: that he cannot unilaterally rewrite 
congressional laws and circumvent the 
people's representatives," Paxton said. 
The nine justices will review a November 
ruling by the New Orleans-based 5th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals that upheld a 
February 2015 decision by U.S. District 
Judge Andrew Hanen in Brownsville, a city 
along the Texas border with Mexico, to halt 
Obama's action. 
With some of his major legislative initiatives 
suffocated by Republican lawmakers, the 
Democratic president has resorted to 
executive action to get around Congress on 
issues including immigration, gun control 
and the Obamacare law. The most recent 
executive action came this month when he 
acted unilaterally to expand background 
checks for certain gun purchases. 
His executive actions have antagonized 
Republicans who accuse him of unlawfully 
taking actions by executive fiat that only 
Congress can perform. 
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The case raises several legal issues, including 
whether states have legal standing to sue the 
U.S. government over decisions on how to 
enforce federal laws. 
'FAITHFULLY EXECUTED' 
The high court added a separate question on 
whether the president's action violated a 
provision of the U.S. Constitution that 
requires the president to "take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed." 
The Obama administration called the 
president's action mere guidance to 
immigration officials on how to exercise 
discretion given by Congress on how to 
enforce immigration laws. 
Obama's action was "consistent with the 
actions taken by presidents of both parties, 
the laws passed by Congress and the 
decisions of the Supreme Court," White 
House spokeswoman Brandi Hoffine said. 
Those eligible for Obama's program, directed 
at illegal immigrants with no criminal record, 
would be able to work legally and receive 
some federal benefits. States were not 
required to provide any benefits. His order 
expanded on a 2012 program that provided 
similar relief for people who became illegal 
immigrants as children. 
The case could have repercussions beyond 
immigration because it would set a precedent 
for the circumstances under which states can 
sue the federal government over a range of 
executive actions. Future presidents, 
Republican or Democratic, could face new 
constraints if the states win. 
The case is one of the most important the 
Supreme Court will decide during its current 
term, along with a challenge to a restrictive 
Texas abortion law. 
If the court sides with Obama, he would have 
until his term ends in January 2017 to 
implement the immigration plan. With the 
U.S. presidential election looming in 
November, it would be up to the next 
president to decide whether to keep it in 
place. 
Obama's action came after a bipartisan 
immigration policy overhaul bill passed by 
the Senate died in the House of 
Representatives. 
The immigration issue has driven a wedge 
between Hispanics, an increasingly important 
voting bloc, and Republicans, many of whom 
have offered tough words about illegal 
immigrants. Most of the estimated 11 million 
illegal immigrants are Hispanics, coming 
from Mexico and other Latin American 
countries. 
The ruling is due just months before the 
presidential election. The two leading 
Democratic presidential hopefuls, Hillary 
Clinton and Bernie Sanders, said on Tuesday 
the court should uphold Obama's action. 
Republican candidates Ted Cruz and Marco 
Rubio said as president they would undo 
Obama's immigration moves. 
Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid said 
Obama’s executive action relied on well-
established constitutional authority. 
He said he recently met with the illegal 
immigrant parents of U.S citizens and lawful 
permanent residents, saying that "these law-
abiding men and women continue to live in 
constant fear of being separated from their 
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children. These families must be allowed to 
step out of the shadows and fully contribute 
to the country that they love and call home."
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The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
blocked a series of President Obama’s 
executive orders on immigration on Monday 
night, frustrating the administration’s efforts 
to shield millions of undocumented 
immigrants from deportation and delivering a 
major setback to a core policy initiative of the 
president’s second-term agenda.* The Justice 
Department said on Tuesday morning that it 
would appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
A three-judge panel ruled against the Obama 
administration on a 2-1 vote in Texas v. 
United States, upholding a lower court’s 
injunction against two programs. Obama 
created one of the programs, called Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans, or DAPA, 
and expanded another, called Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA in 
a unilateral effort to reshape the U.S. 
immigration system after the 2014 midterm 
elections. Texas and 25 other states sued the 
United States soon thereafter, in an attempt to 
halt the executive actions. 
Since the Constitution grants exclusive 
power over immigration law to the federal 
government, the states’ lawsuit might seem 
quixotic. To circumvent this, Texas and the 
other states contend that by granting deferred 
action to an estimated five million  
 
undocumented immigrants, the Obama 
administration’s executive actions force the 
states to either provide services to them or 
change their state laws to avoid doing so. 
Texas, the only state whose standing was 
explicitly recognized by the court, 
specifically argued that the immigrants’ 
“lawful presence” would require the state to 
provide them with “state-subsidized driver’s 
licenses” and unemployment insurance. 
The Obama administration argues that the 
changes are well within the executive 
branch’s discretionary power to enforce 
existing immigration law. But conservative 
opponents counter that the executive actions 
are an unconstitutional usurpation of 
Congress’s power to write American laws. 
President Obama announced his policy 
change last November after considerable 
pressure from immigration-reform activists 
and Dreamers and in response to the defeat of 
comprehensive immigration reform in 
Congress. 
In their decision, two judges sided with the 
states and the lower court in Texas, citing 
both the impact on Texas and the breadth of 
the Obama administration's changes as 
reasons to uphold the injunction. “At its core, 
this case is about the Secretary’s decision to 
change the immigration classification of 
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millions of illegal aliens on a class-wide 
basis,” wrote Judge Jerry Smith in his 
majority opinion. 
The administration’s interpretation of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act, Smith 
wrote, would effectively vest the Secretary of 
Homeland Security with the power “to grant 
lawful presence and work authorization to 
any illegal alien in the United States—an 
untenable position in light of the INA’s 
intricate system of immigration 
classifications and employment eligibility.” 
In other words, Smith wrote, “the INA flatly 
does not permit the reclassification of 
millions of illegal aliens as lawfully present 
and thereby make them newly eligible for a 
host of federal and state benefits, including 
work authorization.” 
In her dissent, the third judge, Carolyn King, 
counseled judicial restraint in what she 
framed as a policy dispute instead of a legal 
one. “Because the DAPA Memorandum 
contains only guidelines for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and does not itself 
confer any benefits to DAPA recipients, I 
would deem this case non-justiciable,” she 
wrote. “The policy decisions at issue in this 
case are best resolved not by judicial fiat, but 
via the political process.” 
King then dives into a lengthy, point-by-point 
rebuttal of the majority’s interpretation of 
Texas’s standing to challenge the executive 
actions, their assertion that the creation of 
DAPA violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and their other conclusions about the 
case. Her colleagues, in an unusual step, 
praised a dissent that strenuously criticized 
them. “Our dedicated colleague has penned a 
careful dissent, with which we largely but 
respectfully disagree,” the other two judges 
said in a footnote. “It is well-researched, 
however, and bears a careful read.” She did 
not reciprocate their praise. “I have a firm and 
definite conviction that a mistake has been 
made,” King concluded. 
The legal saga does not end there. On 
Tuesday, the Department of Justice 
announced it would seek further review from 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In June, my 
colleague David Graham wrote about some 
activists’ hopes that a Supreme Court 
showdown could make immigration reform 
the central issue of the 2016 elections. 
Advocates hope that such a decision would 
make candidates of both parties, but 
particularly Republicans, take a stand on a 
specific immigration question. Rather than 
simply being able to say that they support 
comprehensive immigration reform—a 
vague statement—they will be asked what 
their views are on a clear legal matter, noted 
Clarissa Martínez-De-Castro, deputy vice 
president of the National Council of La Raza. 
The issue plays in down-ballot elections, too. 
There are Senate elections in several states 
with large Latino populations that are 
expected to be close, including Illinois, 
Florida, Nevada, and Colorado. 
To get the case before the Court this term will 
require some alacrity from the Justice 
Department. As South Texas College of Law 
professor Josh Blackman noted, the Obama 
administration is under a tight deadline this 
month to ensure the case is decided during the 
last full Supreme Court term of his 
presidency. 
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[Texas’s] brief in opposition must be filed 30 
days after the case is “placed on the docket.” 
Therefore, if the [Obama administration’s] 
cert petition is filed anytime between now 
and November 20 or so, Texas’s brief in 
opposition would be filed on or before 
December 22, and the petition could be 
distributed for the January 8 conference. 
The only wild card is if Texas either (a) 
waives the brief in opposition, forcing the 
Court to order them to file one, and thus 
stretching the clock or (b) requests an 
extension, pushing us past the January 8 
conference. But in all likelihood, this case 
will be argued the last week in April or the 
first week in May of 2016, with a decision in 
June 2016. 
 
That assumes that the justices would accept 
the case if given the opportunity—a strong 
possibility, but a far from certain conclusion. 
If the Supreme Court declines to hear the 
case, the lower court's preliminary injunction 
would stand until the case’s final resolution, 
which could come under a new president. 
